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community but not in the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that back in the days when what was good for GM was good 
for the country, an advisory committee of economists had recommended to 
the President of the United States that the federal government should 
support the efforts of volunteer communities to design and build cars, either 
for sale or for free distribution to automobile drivers. The committee 
members would probably have been locked up in a psychiatric ward-if 
Senator McCarthy or the House Un-American Activities Committee did not 
get them first. Yet, in September 2000, something like this actually 
happened. The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee 
recommended that the federal government support open source software as 
a strategic national choice to sustain the U.S. lead in critical software 
development. 
At the heart of the economic engine of the world's most advanced 
economies, and in particular that of the United States, we are beginning to 
take notice of a hardy, persistent, and quite amazing phenomenon. A new 
model of production has taken root, one that should not be there, at least 
according to our most widely held beliefs about economic behavior. The 
intuitions of the late twentieth-century American resist the idea that 
thousands of volunteers could collaborate on a complex economic project. 
It certainly should not be that these volunteers will beat the largest and best- 
financed business enterprises in the world at their own game. And yet, this 
is precisely what is happening in the software industry. 
The emergence of free software2 and the phenomenal success of its 
flagships-the GNU/Linux operating system,3 the Apache web server, Perl, 
1. PRESIDENT'S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., DEVELOPING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE TO 
ADVANCE HIGH END COMPUTING (2000), at http://www.ccic.gov/pubs/pitac/pres-oss- 
1 lsepOO.pdf. 
2. I use the terms "free software" and "open source software" interchangeably in this Article. 
Those who consider the phenomenon as first and foremost involving political values, to wit, 
freedom, use the former, in self-conscious contradistinction to those who focus on the economic 
significance, who use the latter. Compare ERIC RAYMOND, Homesteading the Noosphere, in THE 
CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL 
REVOLUTIONARY 65 (2001) [hereinafter THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR] (focusing on the 
economic significance), available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_10/raymond/, with 
Free Software Found., Why "Free Software" Is Better than "Open Source," at 
http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html (last modified Aug. 26, 2002) 
(focusing on the political significance). I have written and continue to write quite extensively on 
the normative implications of how information production is organized, see, e.g., Yochai Benkler, 
The Battle over the Institutional Ecosystem in the Digital Environment, 44 COMM. ACM 84 
(2001), but not in this Article, where I generally abjure disputations over the terms. 
3. I describe the operating system as GNU/Linux to denote that it is a combination of the 
kernel development project initiated by Linus Torvalds in 1991 and of many other operating 
system components created by the GNU project, which was originated in 1984 by Richard 
Stallman, the father of free software. Throughout the Article, I refer to GNU or Linux separately 
to denote the specific development project and to the operating system as GNU/Linux. I departed 
from this practice in the title for stylistic purposes alone. The complete GNU/Linux operating 
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sendmail, BIND-and many other projects4 should force us to take a 
second look at the dominant paradigm we hold about productivity. In the 
late 1930s, Ronald Coase wrote The Nature of the Firm,5 in which he 
explained why firms emerge, defining firms as clusters of resources and 
agents that interact through managerial command systems rather than 
markets. In that paper, Coase introduced the concept of transaction costs, 
which are costs associated with defining and enforcing property and 
contract rights and which are a necessary incident of organizing any activity 
on a market model. Coase explained the emergence and limits of firms 
based on the differences in the transaction costs associated with organizing 
production through markets or through firms. People use markets when the 
gains from doing so, net of transaction costs, exceed the gains from doing 
the same thing in a managed firm, net of organization costs. Firms emerge 
when the opposite is true. Any individual firm will stop growing when its 
organization costs exceed the organization costs of a smaller firm. This 
basic insight was then extended and developed in the work of Oliver 
Williamson and other institutional economists who studied the relationship 
between markets and managerial hierarchies as models of organizing 
production.6 
The emergence of free software as a substantial force in the software- 
development world poses a puzzle for this organization theory. Free 
software projects do not rely either on markets or on managerial hierarchies 
to organize production. Programmers do not generally participate in a 
project because someone who is their boss instructed them, though some 
do. They do not generally participate in a project because someone offers 
them a price, though some participants do focus on long-term appropriation 
through money-oriented activities, like consulting or service contracts. But 
the critical mass of participation in projects cannot be explained by the 
direct presence of a command, a price, or even a future monetary return, 
system is what everyone has in mind when they speak of the breathtaking success of free software 
at making excellent high-end software. 
4. For an excellent history of the free software movement and of the open source 
development methodology, see GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE (2001). 
5. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
6. The initial framing in terms of the opposition between markets and hierarchy was OLIVER 
E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A 
STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975) and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). See also Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 
(1978) (discussing contractual relationships as blurring the line between markets and firms). State 
hierarchies are also an option, and while the extreme version-socialist production-is largely 
discredited, some state production of some goods, like power, is still very much in play. Here, I 
focus only on market production, whether decentralized and price-driven or firm-based and 
managed. Any arguments about the importance of governmental investment in science, research, 
and the arts are independent of the potential conclusions for intellectual property that this Article 
suggests. 
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particularly in the all-important microlevel decisions regarding selection of 
projects to which participants contribute.7 In other words, programmers 
participate in free software projects without following the normal signals 
generated by market-based, firm-based, or hybrid models. 
This puzzle has attracted increasing attention from economists8 and 
participants in the practice9 trying to understand their own success and its 
sustainability given widespread contrary intuitions. Josh Lerer and Jean 
Tirole present the best overarching view of the range of diverse 
micromotivations that drive free software developers.l0 This diversity of 
motivations, somewhat more formalized and generalized, plays an 
important role in my own analysis. Some writing by both practitioners and 
observers, supporters and critics, has focused on the "hacker ethic," and 
analogized the sociological phenomenon to gift-exchange systems."1 Other 
7. Even if it could be established, as it has not, that most contributors to free software 
development projects were motivated by extrinsic monetary rewards, like gaining consulting 
contracts through reputation and human capital gains, price would still be of small explanatory 
value if those motivations led to a general willingness to contribute to some project but did not 
direct the actual selection of projects and type of contribution. It is revealing that while reputation 
is perhaps the most readily available and widely cited extrinsic motivator to contribution, its 
explanatory force wanes when the practices of two of the most successful free software projects 
are considered. Neither the Apache project nor the Free Software Foundation publishes the names 
of individual contributors. It is possible that reputation creation and flow is a more complex social 
phenomenon within the high priesthood than would be implied by explicit attribution, or that the 
star status of the highest priests is a sufficient reputation-based reward. It is also possible-indeed 
likely-that people's motivations are heterogeneous and that some people are more driven by 
explicit reputation gains than others. Whether people who are more driven by explicit reputation 
rewards will indeed cluster in projects where explicit reputation rewards are better organized 
remains a question that has not yet been studied empirically. 
8. An excellent overview of, and insightful contribution to, this literature is the working paper 
STEVEN WEBER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPEN SOURCE (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l 
Econ., Working Paper No. 140, 2000), at http://brie.berkeley.edu/-briewww/pubs/wp/wp 140.pdf. 
9. The canonical references here are to two works by Eric Raymond, an open source software 
developer who turned into the most vocal and widely read commentator on the phenomenon. ERIC 
RAYMOND, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, in THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR, supra note 2, 
at 19, available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/raymond/; RAYMOND, supra note 
2. 
10. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 197, 212-23 (2002). Eric von Hippel has provided both theoretical and empirical support 
for the importance of the use value gained by users in a user-driven innovation environment, both 
in software and elsewhere. See Eric von Hippel, Innovation by User Communities: Learning from 
Open-Source Software, 42 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 82 (2001); Eric von Hippel, at 
http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/Publications.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2002) (providing access 
to many collaborative papers); see also Jean-Michel Dalle & Nicolas Jullien, "Libre" Software: 
Turning Fads into Institutions (Jan. 18, 2001), at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/Libre- 
Software.pdf (analyzing the heterogeneous motivations of contributors in free software projects). 
11. In addition to Raymond, supporters of the sustainability of free software development 
who have used this framework include Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Cooking Pot Markets: An Economic 
Model for the Trade in Free Goods and Services on the Internet, 3 FIRST MONDAY 3 (Mar. 2, 
1998), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/ghosh/. See also Peter Kollock, The 
Economies of Online Cooperation. Gifts and Public Goods in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN
CYBERSPACE 220 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999). Less sanguine views of this 
development model, which are also based on the hacker-ethic framework, include Robert L. 
Glass, The Sociology of Open Source. Of Cults and Cultures, IEEE SOFTWARE, May-June 2000, 
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writing has focused on the special characteristics of software as an object of 
production.12 
In this Article, I approach this puzzle by departing from free software. 
Rather than trying to explain what is special about software or hackers, I 
generalize from the phenomenon of free software to suggest characteristics 
that make large-scale collaborations in many information production fields 
sustainable and productive in the digitally networked environment without 
reliance either on markets or managerial hierarchy.13 Hence the title of this 
Article-to invoke the challenge that the paunchy penguin mascot of the 
Linux kernel development community poses for the view of organization 
rooted in Coase's work. 
Part I begins to tell the tale of the more general phenomenon through a 
number of detailed stories. Tens of thousands of individuals collaborate in 
five-minute increments to map Mars's craters, fulfilling tasks that would 
normally be performed by full-time Ph.D.s. A quarter of a million people 
collaborate on creating the most important news and commentary site 
currently available on technology issues. Twenty-five thousand people 
collaborate to create a peer-reviewed publication of commentary on 
technology and culture. Forty thousand people collaborate to create a more 
at 104, and David Lancashire, Code, Culture and Cash: The Fading Altruism of Open Source 
Development, 6 FIRST MONDAY 3 (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://www.firstmonday.org/ 
issues/issue6_12/lancashire/. For a discussion of the hacker ethic generally, not solely in the 
context of free software development, see PEKKA HIMANEN, LINUS TORVALDS & MANUEL 
CASTELLS, THE HACKER ETHIC (2001). 
12. See, e.g., James Bessen, Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods 
(July 2002), at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/opensrc.pdf. 
13. The most closely related work in the open source software literature is the mapping of 
diverse motivations, see supra notes 10-11, and those papers that try to explain the open source 
software development model in terms of its information-sharing characteristics, ee, e.g., Justin 
Pappas Johnson, Economics of Open Source Software (May 17, 2001), at 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/johnsonopensource.pdf (recognizing superior access to the talent 
pool, but cautioning that free-riding will lead to underutilization); Anca Metiu & Bruce Kogut, 
Distributed Knowledge and the Global Organization of Software Development (Feb. 2001), at 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/kogutl.pdf (claiming that the value of a globally distributed skill 
set will loosen the grip of the richest countries on innovation). 
The only treatment hat specifically uses aspects of Coase's The Nature of the Firm as an 
analytic framework for understanding free software is David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241. Congruent with Coase's conclusion, McGowan 
assumes that hierarchical control is necessary to coordinate projects in the absence of markets, and 
he demonstrates this effect as applied to the Linux kernel development process. He then analyzes 
how the licensing provisions and the social motivations and relationships involved in open source 
software projects form the basis for the hierarchical aspects of this software development model. 
Id. at 275-88. My own use of Coase's insights is very different. See infra Part II. I apply Coase's 
insight regarding the centrality of comparative transaction costs to the organizational form that a 
production enterprise will take. In my model, "information opportunity costs" play a similar role 
in describing the comparative social cost of different organizational forms to the role played by 
transaction costs more generally in the Coasean framework. Peer production emerges, as firms do 
in Coase's analysis, because it can have lower information opportunity costs under certain 
technological and economic conditions. McGowan's analysis therefore primarily intersects with 
this Article where I suggest that the integration in peer production processes sometimes takes the 
form of a hierarchy. 
374 [Vol. 112: 369 
Coase's Penguin 
efficient human-edited directory for the Web than Yahoo. I offer other 
examples as well. 
The point of Part I is simple. The phenomenon of large- and medium- 
scale collaborations among individuals that are organized without markets 
or managerial hierarchies is emerging everywhere in the information and 
cultural production system. The question is how we should understand 
these instances of socially productive behavior: What are the dynamics that 
make them possible and successful, and how should we think about their 
economic value? 
My basic framework for explaining this emerging phenomenon 
occupies Part II of the Article. Collaborative production systems pose an 
information problem. The question that individual agents in such a system 
need to solve in order to be productive is what they should do. Markets 
solve this problem by attaching price signals to alternative courses of 
action. Firms solve this problem by assigning different signals from 
different agents different weights. To wit, what a manager says matters. In 
order to perform these functions, both markets and firms need to specify the 
object of the signal sufficiently so that property, contract, and managerial 
instructions can be used to differentiate between agents, efforts, resources, 
and potential combinations thereof. Where agents, efforts, or resources 
cannot be so specified, they cannot be accurately priced or managed. The 
process of specification creates two sources of inefficiency. First, it causes 
information loss. Perfect specification is unattainable because of transaction 
costs associated with specifying the characteristics of each human and 
material resource and each opportunity for utilization. Second, property and 
contract make clusters of agents and resources sticky. A firm's employees 
will more readily work with a firm's owned resources than with other 
sources and will more readily collaborate with other employees of the firm 
than with outsiders. It is not impossible to acquire and trade resources and 
collaborative efforts, but this is done only when the perceived gains 
outweigh the transaction costs. Nonproprietary production strategies can 
improve on markets and firms by correcting these two failures. 
Commons-based peer production, the emerging third model of 
production I describe here, relies on decentralized information gathering 
and exchange to reduce the uncertainty of participants. It has particular 
advantages as an information process for identifying and allocating human 
creativity available to work on information and cultural resources.14 It 
14. This third mode of production is in some measure similar to the artisan mode of 
production identified by the path-breaking work MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABLE, THE 
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984). There are, however, sufficient qualitative differences that 
make this a new phenomenon requiring its own set of understandings, rather than a latter-day 
artisan cooperative. Most important are the scale of these collaborations, the absence of entry 
barriers in many or most of them, and the absence of direct appropriation of the products. With 
regard to organization literature, commons-based peer production stands in a similar relationship 
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depends on very large aggregations of individuals independently scouring 
their information environment in search of opportunities to be creative in 
small or large increments. These individuals then self-identify for tasks and 
perform them for a variety of motivational reasons that I discuss at some 
length. 
If the problems of motivation and organization can be solved, then 
commons-based peer production has two major advantages over firms and 
markets. First, it places the point of decision about assigning any given 
person to any given set of resources with the individual. Given the high 
variability among individuals and across time in terms of talent, experience, 
motivation, focus, availability, etc., human creativity is an especially 
difficult resource to specify for efficient contracting or management. Firms 
recognize this and attempt to solve this problem by creating various 
incentive compensation schemes and intangible reward schemes, like 
employee-of-the-month awards. These schemes work to some extent to 
alleviate the information loss associated with managerial production, but 
only insofar as a firm's agents and resources are indeed the best and only 
insofar as these schemes capture all the motivations and contributions 
accurately. Peer production provides a framework within which individuals 
who have the best information available about their own fit for a task can 
self-identify for the task. This provides an information gain over firms and 
markets, but only if the system develops some mechanism to filter out 
mistaken judgments that agents make about themselves. This is why 
practically all successful peer production systems have a robust mechanism 
for peer review or statistical weeding out of contributions from agents who 
misjudge themselves. 
The allocation gains of peer production are as important as the 
information gains. Human creativity cannot be assumed to be an on-off 
switch of suitability for a job, as simple models of industrial production 
might treat labor. One cannot say in the information context that "this 
person passes threshold suitability requirements to pull this lever all day" 
and ignore variability beyond that fact. It is more likely that variability in 
productivity will be large for different people with any given set of 
resources and collaborators for any given set of projects. I describe this 
diversity as a probability that any agent will be a good fit with a set of 
resources and agents to produce valuable new information or cultural 
goods. Peer production has an advantage over firms and markets because it 
allows larger groups of individuals to scour larger groups of resources in 
search of materials, projects, collaborations, and combinations than is 
to artisan production as, in the property literature, commons relate to common property regimes. 
These are phenomena that share several characteristics, but ultimately diverge in central 
characteristics that require different explanations. 
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possible for firms or individuals who function in markets. Transaction costs 
associated with property and contract limit the access of people to each 
other, to resources, and to projects when production is organized on a 
market or firm model, but not when it is organized on a peer production 
model.15 Because fit of people to projects and to each other is variable, 
there are increasing returns to the scale of the number of people, resources, 
and projects capable of being combined. 
The advantages of peer production are, then, improved identification 
and allocation of human creativity. These advantages appear to have 
become salient, because human creativity itself has become salient. In the 
domain of information and culture, production generally comprises the 
combination of preexisting information/cultural inputs, human creativity, 
and the physical capital necessary to (1) fix ideas and human utterances in 
media capable of storing and communicating them and (2) transmit them. 
Existing information and culture are a public good in the strict economic 
sense of being nonrival.'6 The cost of physical capital was for more than 
150 years the central organizing principle of information and cultural 
production, from the introduction of high-cost, high-volume mechanical 
presses, through telegraph, telephone, radio, film, records, television, cable, 
and satellite systems. These costs largely structured production around a 
capital-intensive, industrial model. The declining price of computation, 
however, has inverted the capital structure of information and cultural 
production. Inexpensive desktop PCs, as well as digital video and audio 
systems, are now capable of performing most of the physical capital 
functions that once required substantial investments. Where physical capital 
costs for fixation and communication are low and widely distributed, and 
where existing information is itself a public good, the primary remaining 
scarce resource is human creativity. And it is under these conditions that the 
15. This is not to say that there are no transaction costs associated with peer production. It is 
merely to say that these transaction costs, which largely fall under the rubric of"integration" that I 
describe in Section III.B, are of a different type. They may undermine the successful integration 
of a project or may make participation too costly for contributors, but they do not arise as a barrier 
to prevent many individuals from collaborating in the same resource space or to prevent many 
resources from populating that space. 
16. While the reference to information as a public good is common, the reference to culture is 
not. I have no intention to go into subtle definitions of culture here, though I tend to follow the 
approach offered in J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE (1998), by thinking of culture as a 
framework for comprehension. By "culture" I mean a set of representations, conceptions, 
interpretations, knowledge of social behavior patterns, etc., whose particular application to 
reducing uncertainty for human action is too remote to be called "information," but which is 
indispensable to the way we make sense of the world. "Cultural production" as I use it here can be 
done by parents, teachers, Hollywood, Mozart, the Pope, peer groups, and the guys playing guitars 
in Washington Square Park. Defined as a set of conceptions and their representations and as sets 
of behavioral instructions, its economic character is similar to ideas or information. Obviously, 
embodiments of culture, like a specific statue or building, are no more nonrival than embodiments 
of any other form of information, like a book or a corkscrew. 
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relative advantages of peer production emerge to much greater glory than 
possible before. 
This leaves the motivation and organization questions. These generally 
would fall under the "tragedy of the commons" critique, which I 
purposefully invoke by calling the phenomenon "commons-based" peer 
production. The traditional objections to the commons are primarily 
twofold. First, no one will invest in a project if they cannot appropriate its 
benefits. That is, motivation will lack. Second, no one has the power to 
organize collaboration in the use of the resource. That is, organization will 
lack and collaboration will fail. The past decade or so, however, has seen an 
important emerging literature on some successful commons and common 
property regimes.17 These primarily involve the introduction of a variety of 
nonproperty-based schemes for structuring cooperation among relatively 
limited groups of participants. While offering important insights into how 
formal and informal norms can structure collaboration, these studies of 
common appropriation regimes do not give a complete answer to the 
sustainability of motivation and organization for the truly open, large-scale 
nonproprietary peer production projects we see on the Internet. 
My answer to these problems occupies Part III. The motivation problem 
is solved by two distinct analytic moves. The first involves the proposition 
that diverse motivations animate human beings, and, more importantly, that 
there exist ranges of human experience in which the presence of monetary 
rewards is inversely related to the presence of other, social-psychological 
rewards. The interaction between money, love, and sex offers an obvious 
and stark example, but the tradeoffs that academics face between selling 
consulting services, on the one hand, and writing within a research agenda 
respected by peers, on the other hand, are also reasonably intuitive. Given 
these propositions, it becomes relatively straightforward to see that there 
will be conditions under which a project that can organize itself to offer 
social-psychological rewards removed from monetary rewards will attract 
certain people, or at least certain chunks of people's days, that monetary 
rewards would not. 
The second analytic move involves understanding that when a project 
of any size is broken up into little pieces, each of which can be performed 
by an individual in a short amount of time, the motivation to get any given 
individual to contribute need only be very small. This suggests that peer 
production will thrive where projects have three characteristics. First, they 
must be modular. That is, they must be divisible into components, or 
17. For discussions of commons, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); and Carol Rose, The Comedy of 
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 
(1986). A brief discussion of these concepts as applied to peer production follows below. See infra 
notes 112-120 and accompanying text. 
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modules, each of which can be produced independently of the production of 
the others. This enables production to be incremental and asynchronous, 
pooling the efforts of different people, with different capabilities, who are 
available at different times. Second, the granularity of the modules is 
important and refers to the sizes of the project's modules. For a peer 
production process to pool successfully a relatively large number of 
contributors, the modules should be predominately fine-grained, or small in 
size. This allows the project to capture contributions from large numbers of 
contributors whose motivation levels will not sustain anything more than 
small efforts toward the project. Novels, for example, at least those that 
look like our current conception of a novel, are likely to prove resistant to 
peer production.18 In addition, a project will likely be more efficient if it can 
accommodate variously sized contributions. Heterogeneous granularity will 
allow people with different levels of motivation to collaborate by making 
smaller- or larger-grained contributions, consistent with their levels of 
motivation. Third, and finally, a successful peer production enterprise must 
have low-cost integration, which includes both quality control over the 
modules and a mechanism for integrating the contributions into the finished 
product. If a project cannot defend itself from incompetent or malicious 
contributions and integrate the competent modules into a finished product at 
sufficiently low cost, integration will either fail or the integrator will be 
forced to appropriate the residual value of the common project-usually 
leading to a dissipation of the motivations to contribute ex ante. Automated 
integration and iterative peer production of integration are the primary 
mechanisms by which peer production projects described in this Article 
have lowered the cost of integration to the point where they can succeed 
and sustain themselves. The use of free software to integrate peer 
production of other information goods is a prime example. As for a 
project's mechanisms for defending itself from incompetent or malicious 
contributions, one sees peer production enterprises using a variety of 
approaches toward solving collective action problems that are relatively 
familiar from the commons literature offline. These include various formal 
rules, like the GNU General Public License (GPL)19 that prevents 
18. The most successful novel-like enterprise on the Interet of which I know is "The 
Company Therapist." Pipsqueak Prods., The Company Therapist, at http://www.thetherapist.com 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2002). There, the collaborative fiction problem was solved by building a 
system that enabled anyone to contribute a small chunk-patient's interview notes, therapist's 
comments, etc.-to the company therapist's files. The common project is to create a fascinating 
mosaic of people and stories seen through the eyes of a company therapist. Most collaborative 
fiction sites, however, suffer from the fact that modularity and granularity lead to disjunction 
relative to our expectations of novels. 
19. The GNU GPL is the most important institutional innovation of the Free Software 
Foundation founded by Richard Stallman. Free Software Found., GNU General Public License, at 
http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). It prevents defection from free 
software projects in the form of combining code others have written with one's own code and then 
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defection20 from many free software projects, including most prominently 
its flagship, GNU/Linux. They also include technical constraints that 
prevent or limit the effects of defection. Social norms too play a role in 
sustaining some of these collaborations, in both small groups and larger 
groups where the platform allows for effective monitoring and repair when 
individuals defect. Finally, the sheer size of some of these projects enables 
the collaboration platform to correct for defection by using redundancy of 
contributions and averaging out of outliers-be they defectors or 
incompetents. 
The normative implications of recognizing peer production are 
substantial. At the level of political morality, the shape of freedom and 
equality in the emerging social-technological condition we associate with 
the Interet is at stake. Political views can take radical forms, both 
anarchistic and libertarian, as they do in the work of Eben Moglen, who 
was the first to identify the phenomenon I now call peer production,21 and 
in the minds of many in the free software community.22 But the stakes for 
freedom and equality are high for a wide range of liberal commitments.23 At 
the level of institutional design, the emergence of commons-based peer 
production adds a new and deep challenge to the prevailing policy of rapid 
releasing it under more restrictive license terms than the original free software. This license does 
not prevent commercial distribution of free software for a fee. It places certain limits on how the 
software can be used as an input into derivative works that would be made less free than the 
original. In this, it radically breaks from the concept of the public domain that underlies copyright 
law's general background rule for nonproprietary materials. For discussions of the GPL and its 
legal nature and institutional characteristics, ee Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GPL, LINUXUSER, 
Sept. 2001, at 66, http://www.linuxuser.co.uk/articles/issue14/lu4-Free_Speech-Enforcing_the_ 
GPL.pdf; and Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GPL II, LINUXUSER, Oct. 2001, at 66, 
http://www.linuxuser.co.uk/articles/issue 5/lu 15-Free_Speech-Enforcing_the_GPLpart_two.pdf. 
Moglen's views are particularly important since he has been General Counsel to the Free Software 
Foundation for the past decade and has more experience with enforcing this license than anyone 
else. More detailed academic treatments include McGowan, supra note 13, and Margaret Jane 
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth qf Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in 
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L.REV. 1295 (1998). 
20. I use the term "defection" to describe any action that an agent who participates in a 
cooperative enterprise can take to increase his or her own benefit from the common effort in a 
way that undermines the success or integrity of the common effort. 
21. Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant. Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 
FIRST MONDAY 1 (Aug. 2, 1999), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/. The 
descriptive insight in that paper that corresponds to peer production is the phenomenon he calls 
Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law: 
Moglen's Metaphorical Corollary to Faraday's Law says that if you wrap the Internet 
around every person on the planet and spin the planet, software flows in the network. 
It's an emergent property of connected human minds that they create things for one 
another's pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. 
Id. 
22. Canonical, of course, are Richard Stallman's ideas, which permeate the "Philosophy of 
the GNU Project." See Free Software Found., Philosophy of the GNU Project, at 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2002). 
23. I outline the breadth of the range of liberal commitments affected by these issues in 
Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2003). 
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expansion of the scope of exclusive rights in information and culture that 
has been the predominant approach in the past twenty-five years, as James 
Boyle's work on the second enclosure movement elegantly elucidates.24 
Additionally, the dynamic of decentralized innovation plays a central role 
in Lawrence Lessig's forceful argument for embedding the openness of 
commons in the architecture of the Internet.25 In this Article, however, I do 
not attempt to add to the normative literature. Instead, the Article is 
intended as a purely descriptive account of the scope of the empirical 
phenomenon and its analytic drivers. 
One important caveat is necessary. I am not suggesting that peer 
production will supplant markets or firms. I am not suggesting that it is 
always the more efficient model of production for information and culture. 
What I am saying is that this emerging third model is (1) distinct from the 
other two and (2) has certain systematic advantages over the other two in 
identifying and allocating human capital/creativity. When peer production 
will surpass the advantages that the other two models may have in 
triggering or directing human behavior through the relatively reliable and 
reasonably well-understood triggers of money and hierarchy is a matter for 
more detailed study. I offer some ways of understanding the limitations of 
this model of production in Part III, but do not attempt a full answer to 
these questions here. 
I. PEER PRODUCTION ALL AROUND 
While open source software development has captured the attention and 
devotion of many, it is by no stretch of the imagination the first or most 
important instance of production by peers who interact and collaborate 
without being organized on either a market-based or a 
managerial/hierarchical model. Most important in this regard is the 
academic enterprise, and in particular scientific research. Thousands of 
individuals make contributions to a body of knowledge, set up internal 
systems of quality control, and produce the core of our information and 
knowledge environment. These individuals do not expect to exclude from 
their product anyone who does not pay for it, and for many of them the 
opportunity cost of participating in academic research, rather than applying 
themselves to commercial enterprise, carries a high economic price tag. In 
other words, individuals produce on a nonproprietary basis and contribute 
their product to a knowledge "commons" that no one is understood as 
24. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke Law School, Nov. 9-11, 
2001, at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/boyle.pdf. 
25. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2001). 
2002] 381 
The Yale Law Journal 
"owning," and that anyone can, indeed is required by professional norms to, 
take and extend. We appropriate the value of our contributions using a 
variety of methods: service-based rather than product-based models 
(teaching rather than book royalties), grant funding from government and 
nonprofit sources, as well as reputation and similar intangible but 
immensely powerful motivations embodied in prizes, titles, etc. In the 
excitement of a moment that feels like one of great transformation, it is 
easy, though unjustifiable, to forget that information production is one area 
where we have always had a mixed system of commercial/proprietary and 
nonproprietary peer production-not as a second best or a contingent 
remainder from the Middle Ages, but because at some things the 
nonproprietary peer production system of the academic world is simply 
better.26 
In one way, however, academic peer production and commercial 
production are similar. Both are composed of people who are professional 
information producers. The individuals involved in production have to keep 
body and soul together from information production. However low the 
academic salary is, it must still be enough to permit one to devote most of 
one's energies to academic work. The differences reside in the modes of 
appropriation and in the modes of organization-in particular, how projects 
are identified and how individual effort is allocated to projects. Academics 
select their own projects and contribute their work to a common pool that 
eventually comprises our knowledge of a subject matter, while 
nonacademic producers will often be given their marching orders by 
managers, who take their cue from market studies and eventually sell the 
product in the market. 
Alongside the professional model, it is also important to recognize that 
we have always had nonprofessional information and cultural production on 
a nonproprietary model. Individuals talking to each other are creating 
information goods, sometimes in the form of what we might call 
entertainment and sometimes as a means for news distribution or 
commentary. Nonprofessional production has been immensely important in 
terms of each individual's information environment. If one considers how 
much of the universe of communications one receives in a day from other 
26. An early version of this position is Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic 
Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1959). More recently one sees the work, for example, 
of Rebecca S. Eisenberg. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development. 
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 
1715-24 (1996) (summarizing the argument for giving preference to universities and nonprofit 
institutions in the allocation of patent rights). For a historical description of the role of market and 
nonmarket institutions in science, see P.A. David, From Market Magic to Calypso Science Policy, 
26 RES. POL'Y 229 (1997) (reviewing TERENCE KEALEY, THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH (1996)). 
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individuals in one-to-one or small-scale interactions-such as e-mail, lunch, 
or hallway conversations-the effect becomes tangible. 
Nonetheless, ubiquitous computer communications networks are 
bringing about a dramatic change in the scope, scale, and efficacy of peer 
production. As computers and network connections become faster, cheaper, 
and more ubiquitous, we are seeing the phenomenon of nonprofessional 
peer production of information scale to much larger sizes and perform more 
complex tasks than were possible in the past for nonprofessional 
production. To make this phenomenon more tangible, I will describe in this 
Part a number of such enterprises, organized to demonstrate the feasibility 
of this approach throughout the information-production and information- 
exchange chain. 
While it is possible to break an act of communication into finer-grained 
subcomponents,27 largely we see three distinct functions involved in the 
process. First, there is an initial utterance of a humanly meaningful 
statement. Writing an article or drawing a picture is such an action, whether 
done by a professional or an amateur and whether high quality or low. 
Second, there is the separate function of mapping the initial utterances onto 
a knowledge map. In particular, an utterance must be understood as 
"relevant" and "credible." Relevance is a subjective question of mapping an 
utterance on the conceptual map of a given user seeking information for a 
particular purpose defined by that individual. If I am interested in learning 
about the political situation in Macedonia, a news report from Macedonia or 
Albania is relevant, even if sloppy, while a Disney cartoon is not, even if 
highly professionally rendered. Credibility is a question of quality by some 
objective measure that the individual adopts for purposes of evaluating a 
given utterance. Again, the news report may be sloppy and not credible, 
while the Disney cartoon may be highly accredited as a cartoon. The 
distinction between the two is somewhat artificial, however, because very 
often the utility of a piece of information will depend on a combined 
valuation of its credibility and relevance. A New York Times story on the 
Balkans in general, for example, will likely be preferable to excited gossip 
in the cafeteria specifically about Macedonia. I will therefore refer to 
"relevance/accreditation" as a single function for purposes of this 
discussion, keeping in mind that the two are complementary and not 
entirely separable functions that an individual requires in order to use 
utterances of others in putting together the user's understanding of the 
world. 
Finally, there is the function of distribution, or how one takes an 
utterance produced by one person and distributes it to other people who find 
27. See Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution of 
Control over Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 183, 186 (1998). 
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it credible and relevant. In the mass media world, these functions were 
often, though not always, integrated. NBC News produced the utterances, 
gave them credibility, and distributed them. The Internet is permitting much 
greater disaggregation of these functions, and so this Part will proceed to 
describe how each component of this information-production chain is being 
produced using a peer-based model on the Internet for information and 
cultural goods other than software. 
A. Content 
NASA Clickworkers is "an experiment that showed that public 
volunteers (clickworkers), many working for a few minutes here and 
there .. . can do some routine science analysis that would normally be done 
by a scientist or graduate student working for months on end."28 Users can 
mark craters on maps of Mars, classify craters that have already been 
marked, or search the landscape of Mars for "honeycomb" terrain. The 
project is "a pilot study with very limited funding, run part-time by one 
software engineer, with occasional input from two scientists."29 In its first 
six months of operation, more than 85,000 users visited the site, with many 
contributing to the 1.9 million entries recorded (including redundant entries 
of the same craters used to average out errors). An analysis of the quality of 
markings showed that "the automatically-computed consensus of a large 
number of clickworkers is virtually indistinguishable from the inputs of a 
geologist with years of experience in identifying Mars craters."30 The tasks 
performed by clickworkers are discrete, and each iteration is easily 
performed in a matter of minutes. As a result, users can choose to work for 
a few minutes by doing one iteration or for hours by doing many, with an 
early study of the project suggesting that some clickworkers indeed work 
on the project for weeks, but that 37% of the work was done by one-time 
contributors.31 
The Clickworkers project is a particularly crisp example of how 
complex professional tasks that formerly required budgeting the full-time 
salaries of a number of highly trained individuals can be reorganized to be 
performed by tens of thousands of volunteers in increments so minute that 
the tasks can now be performed on a much lower budget. This low budget 
is devoted to coordinating the volunteer effort, and the raw human capital 
28. NASA, Welcome to the Clickworkers Study, at http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/top (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
29. NASA, Credits and Contacts, at http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/contact (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2002). 
30. NASA, CLICKWORKERS RESULTS: CRATER MARKING ACTIVITY (July 3, 2001), at 
http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/documents/crater-marking.pdf. 
31. B. KANEFSKY ET AL., CAN DISTRIBUTED VOLUNTEERS ACCOMPLISH MASSIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS TASKS? 1 (2001), at http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/documents/abstract.pdf. 
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needed is contributed for the fun of it. The professionalism of the original 
scientists is replaced by a combination of fine-grained modularization of the 
task with redundancy and automated averaging out of both errors and 
purposeful defections (for example, purposefully erroneous markings).32 
NASA scientists running this experiment tapped into a vast pool of five- 
minute increments of human judgment applied with motivation that is 
unrelated to keeping together the bodies and souls of the agents. 
While Clickworkers is a distinct, self-conscious experiment, it suggests 
characteristics of distributed production that are quite widely observable. 
Consider, for example, how the networked environment has enabled new 
ways of fulfilling the traditional function of encyclopedias or almanacs. At 
the most general level, consider the World Wide Web itself. Individuals put 
up websites with all manner of information, in all kinds of quality and 
focus, for reasons that have nothing to do with external, well-defined 
economic motives-just like the individuals who identify craters on Mars. 
A user interested in information need only plug a request into a search 
engine like Google, and dozens or hundreds of websites will appear. Now, 
there is a question of how to select among them-the question of relevance 
and accreditation-but that is for the next Section. For now it is important 
to recognize that the Web is a global library produced by millions of 
people. Whenever you sit down to search for information, there is a very 
high likelihood that someone, somewhere, has produced a usable answer, 
for whatever reason-pleasure, self-advertising, or fulfilling some other 
public or private goal as a nonprofit or for-profit institution that sustains 
itself by means other than selling the information you need. The power of 
the Web to answer such an encyclopedic question comes not from the fact 
that one particular site has all the great answers. It is not an Encyclopedia 
Britannica. The power comes from the fact that it allows a user looking for 
specific information at a given time to collect answers from a sufficiently 
large number of contributions. The task of sifting and accrediting falls to 
the user, who is motivated by the need to find an answer to the question 
posed. As long as there are tools to lower the cost of that task to a level 
acceptable to the user, the Web will have "produced" the information 
content the user sought. These are not trivial considerations, but they are 
also not intractable. As we shall see, some of the solutions can themselves 
be peer produced and some solutions are emerging as a function of the 
speed of computation and communication, which enables more efficient 
technological solutions. 
32. NASA, supra note 30, at 3 (describing, among other things, the exclusion of the markings 
of a student in an art class who marked concentric circles for a class assignment instead of trying 
to mark craters). 
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One might argue that the Internet is still not an encyclopedia, in the 
sense of a coherently ordered locus of a wide range of human knowledge in 
relatively accessible and digested form. Can that task, which requires more 
disciplined writing, be performed within a distributed model? The 
beginning of an answer is provided by the Wikipedia project.33 The project 
involves roughly 2000 volunteers who are collaborating to write an 
encyclopedia. The project runs on a free software collaborative authorship 
tool, Wiki, which is a markup language similar in concept to HTML, but is 
relatively easier to implement, allows multiple people to edit a single 
document and interlock multiple documents, and generates archives of the 
changes made to each. While 2000 people have not been able to generate a 
complete encyclopedia in roughly 18 months of operation, they have made 
substantial progress, producing about 30,000 articles, and readers are 
invited to evaluate the quality.34 A comparison to www.encyclopedia.com, 
the online version of the Columbia Encyclopedia, would suggest that 
Wikipedia cannot yet be said to be either systematically better or worse. 
Given that it is a volunteer effort, and that the comparison is to an 
established commercial encyclopedia, that is actually saying quite a bit. 
Perhaps the most interesting characteristic about Wikipedia is the self- 
conscious social-norms-based dedication to objective writing. The 
following fragments from the self-described essential characteristics and 
basic policies of Wikipedia are illustrative: 
First and foremost, the Wikipedia project is self-consciously an 
encyclopedia rather than a dictionary, discussion forum, web 
portal, etc. See encyclopedia as well as what Wikipedia is not. 
Wikipedia's participants commonly follow, and enforce, a few 
basic policies that seem essential to keeping the project running 
smoothly and productively. The following are just a few of those 
policies; for more information, please see Wikipedia policy. 
First, because we have a huge variety of participants of all 
ideologies, and from around the world, Wikipedia is committed to 
making its articles as unbiased as possible. The aim is not to write 
articles from a single objective point of view-this is a common 
misunderstanding of the policy-but rather, to fairly and 
sympathetically present all views on an issue. See neutral point of 
33. Wikipedia, Main Page, at http://www.wikipedia.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
34. The terms "chimpanzee," "computational complexity theory," or simply "copyright," for 
example, provide good demonstrations. 
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view page for further explanation, and for a very lengthy 
discussion.35 
The participants of Wikipedia are plainly people who like to write. 
Some of them participate in other collaborative projects, like 
Everything2.com.36 But when they enter the common project of Wikipedia, 
they participate in a particular way-a way that the group has adopted to 
make its "encyclopedia."37 Wikipedia provides a rich example of a 
medium-sized collection of individuals who successfully collaborate to 
create an information product of mid- to highbrow quality. In particular, it 
suggests that even in a group of this size, social norms coupled with a 
simple facility to allow any participant to edit out blatant opinion written by 
another in contravention of the social norms keep the group on track. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated locus of peer reviewed, mid- to high- 
quality essays published on the Interet as of early 2002 is Kuro5hin, also 
known as K5.38 
35. Wikipedia, Essential Characteristics, at http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/wikipedia (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2002) (hyperlinks indicated by underlining). The "Neutral Point of View" page is 
indeed revealing of how explicit and central to the project the social norm of objective writing is. 
See Wikipedia, Neutral Point of View, at http://www.wikipedia.com/wiki/wikipedia:neutral 
+point+of+view (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
36. See Everything Dev. Co., Everything@Everything2.com, at http://www.everything2.com 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2002). Everything2 is a "complex online community with a focus to write, 
publish and edit a quality database of information, insight and humor." Id. (under the "Everything 
FAQ" hyperlink). The system enables registered users to post "write-ups" and create "nodes" 
pertaining to particular topics that they define. It does not have a directory structure; instead, 
nodes are linked together with hypertext within the text of the node and also with a matrix of 
related links at the bottom of each node. The linking is done initially by the author-thereby self- 
generating a conceptual map-and later by others. A node is a particular topic identified by the 
title of the node. After the author of the first write-up creates a "nodeshell," other users can add 
additional write-ups to that node. Write-ups are constantly being reviewed and removed by 
editors. Editors are chosen based on "merit, seniority and writing skill." Everything Dev. Co., The 
Power Structure of Everything2, at http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=743129 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2002). Everything2 also contains a voting system for non-editor users to vote on 
each other's write-ups. Although each write-up has a reputation based on whether it has been 
voted up or down, the write-up does not get automatically filtered due to a low reputation. In other 
words, the system combines individually authored materials and individually defined mappings of 
relevance of materials with common procedures, some purely democratic and some based on a 
rotating hierarchy of editors appointed by experience and reputation built from the collective 
judgments of their peers. The result is a substantial database of writings on a wide variety of 
topics. 
37. On their interpretation, creating an encyclopedia entry means conveying in brief terms the 
state of the art on the topic, including divergent opinions about it, but not the author's opinion. 
Whether that is an attainable goal is a subject of interpretive theory and is a question as applicable 
to a professional encyclopedia as it is to Wikipedia. 
38. KuroShin, Front Page, at http://www.kuro5hin.org (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). The 
discussion here is deeply indebted to the work of Caio M.S. Pereira Neto. See Caio M.S. Pereira 
Neto, Kuro5hin.org, Collaborative Media, and Political Economy of Information (May 24, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Another source is Everett Teach et al., Ethnography 
of Kuro5hin.org, at http://ccwf.cc.utexas.edu/~hackett/k5/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
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Kuro5hin.org is a community of people who like to think. You will 
not find garbage in the discussions here, because noise is not 
tolerated. This is a site for people who want to discuss the world 
they live in. It's a site for people who are on the ground in the 
modern world, and who sometimes look around and wonder what 
they have wrought.39 
As of March 2002, it appeared that Kuro5hin had roughly 25,000 
users.40 Articles run a broad gamut of topics but are supposed to be roughly 
centered around technology and culture. The general headings include 
Technology, Culture, Politics, Media, News, Op-ed, Columns, Meta 
(dedicated to discussion of K5 itself), and MLP (mindless link propagation, 
a general catchall category of things the community members find 
interesting). The articles include news reports from other sources, but most 
of the interesting materials provide some form of commentary as well. The 
articles and responses to them are fairly substantial. 
The site and community have a heavy emphasis on the quality of 
materials published. The guide to article submissions41 emphasizes quality 
of information and writing multiple drafts and prepares new contributors for 
the experience of close peer review of their submission. Additionally, the 
software that runs Kuro5hin, Scoop, a free software project initiated by one 
of the cofounders of K5, implements a series of steps both before and after 
submission and publication of an article that serve as collaborative quality- 
control mechanisms. The emphasis on quality is enforced by the site's 
mechanism for peer review prepublication and peer commentary 
postpublication.42 
39. KuroShin, Mission Statement, at http://ww.kuro5hin.org/special/mission (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2002) (emphasis omitted). 
40. How Will K5 Avoid Being Crushed by Content? (Mar. 17, 2002), at 
http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2002/3/16/51221/8976. 
41. Kuro5hin, FAQ-Article Submission Questions, at http://www.kuro5hin.org/ 
?op=special;page=article (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
42. When an article is submitted, it is not automatically placed in a publicly viewable space. 
It is placed, instead, in a submission queue. At that point, all registered users of K5 have an 
opportunity to comment on the article, provide suggestions for correction and improvement, and 
vote their opinion whether they think the story should be placed on the front page, a specialty 
page, or rejected. The system determines ome critical number of votes necessary for any one of 
these actions, based on the number of users then registered. Typically, rejection requires fewer 
votes than acceptance. Articles may be resubmitted after being rejected, typically after having 
been revised in accordance with the comments. The system up to this point is remarkably similar 
to academic peer review in many respects, except for the scope of participation and the egalitarian 
and democratic structure of the editorial decision. After publication, K5 provides the platform for 
readers to comment on articles and for other readers to rate these comments for their relevance 
and quality. The system is different in various respects from the Slashdot system described in 
detail infra Section I.B, but the principle is the same. It permits readers to post comments, and it 
permits other readers to rate comments as better or worse. It aggregates these individual ratings 
into collective judgments about the quality of comments, judgments that can then be used by the 
site's readers to filter out lower-quality comments. In general, all these characteristics go to 
questions of how one generates relevance and accreditation on a peer production model and will 
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A very different type of trend in collaborative creation is the emergence 
and rise of computer games, in particular multiplayer online games. These 
fall in the same cultural "time slot" as television shows and movies of the 
twentieth century. The interesting thing about them is that they are 
structurally different. In a game like Ultima Online or EverQuest, the role 
of the commercial provider is not to tell a finished, highly polished story to 
be consumed start to finish by passive consumers. Rather, the role of the 
game provider is to build tools with which users collaborate to tell a story. 
There have been observations about this approach for years regarding 
MUDs and MOOs.43 The point here is that there is a type of "content" that 
be explored in greater detail in the context of other sites in the next Section. The point to take 
away at this juncture is that part of what makes K5 so successful in maintaining quality is a rather 
elaborate, large-scale peer review system and postpublication commentary, which itself is then 
peer reviewed in an iterative process. 
43. MUDs (Multi-User Dungeon or Multi-User Dimension) and MOOs (MUD, Object 
Oriented) are acronyms for software programs that create an interactive multiuser networked text- 
based virtual world. The software maintains a database of users and objects with which the users 
can interact in a variety of ways. MUDs are typically built around a theme. MUD "worlds" are 
often based on books, movies, cartoons, and other role-playing games. See RPer's Resources for 
Interactive Roleplaying on Moos/Mucks/Muds/Mushes, at http://www.geocities.com/ 
TimesSquare/9944/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). Pavel Curtis, creator of perhaps the most famous 
of MOOs, LambdaMOO, identified three elements that distinguish MUDs from typical role- 
playing games: 
* A MUD is not goal-oriented; it has no beginning or end, no "score," 
and no notion of "winning" or "success." In short, even though users of 
MUDs are commonly called players, a MUD isn't really a game at all. 
* A MUD is extensible from within; a user can add new objects to the 
database such as rooms, exits, "things," and notes. Certain MUDs, 
including the one I run, even support an embedded programming 
language in which a user can describe whole new kinds of behavior for 
the objects they create. 
* A MUD generally has more than one user connected at a time. All of 
the connected users are browsing and manipulating the same database 
and can encounter the new objects created by others. The multiple users 
on a MUD can communicate with each other in real time. 
Pavel Curtis, Mudding: Social Phenomena in Text-Based Virtual Realities, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 1992 CONFERENCE ON THE DIRECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED COMPUTING 
(2002), at http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/curtis92mudding.html. There are acronyms for MUD-like 
variations including MUSH, MUX, and MUCK. All of the variations run basically the same 
software; the primary difference between them is how much freedom the characters have to 
modify the environment. All M*s (M* refers to any MUD-like variants) are administered in some 
way by those who set up the software and maintain the connectivity. Typically, the administrator 
will set up the initial world and implement some coded commands. The administrator will also set 
up a hierarchy of user levels granting users more control over the objects within the game as they 
advance, such as the ability to create coded commands. It is these decisions-how much of the 
world does the administrator create, how rich are the coded commands, does the administrator 
allow users to have the power to manipulate the game-that distinguish the various M*s from 
each other. MUDs are typically heavy on coded commands and designed to be battle-ready. 
MUSHs, on the other hand, are "unlikely to have coded commands to the same extent that a MUD 
will, relying instead on arbitration or consent to determine the effects of actions." Michael 
Sullivan, An Explanation of Terminology, at http://wso.williams.edu:8000/-msulliva/ 
mushes/explan.html ( ast visited Aug. 31, 2002). MOOs are perhaps the exception in that most of 
them are not role-playing, but "educational or social." Id. 
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can be produced in a centralized professional manner-the screenwriter 
here replaces the scientist in the NASA Clickworkers example-that can 
also be organized using the appropriate software platform to allow the story 
to be written by the many users as they experience it. The users are 
coauthors whose individual contributions to the storyline are literally done 
for fun. They are playing a game, but they are spending real economic 
goods-their attention and substantial subscription fees-on a form of 
entertainment hat displaces passive reception of a finished, professionally 
manufactured good with active coproduction of a storyline. The individual 
contributions are much more substantial than the time needed to mark 
craters, but then the contributors are having a whole lot more fun 
manipulating the intrigues of their imaginary Guild than poring over 
digitized images of faint craters on Mars. 
B. Relevance/Accreditation 
You might say that many distributed individuals can produce content, 
but that it is gobbledygook. Who in their right mind wants to get answers to 
legal questions from a fifteen-year-old child who learned the answers from 
Most important in the history of MUDs was LambdaMOO. "LambdaMOO is a MOO: a 
MUD that uses an object-oriented programming language to manipulate objects in the virtual 
world." AT&T Cobot Project, What's a LambdaMOO?, at http://cobot.research.att.com/ 
lambdaMOO.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). LambdaMOO was created in 1990 by Pavel Curtis 
as a social experiment. "[It] is the first, most diverse, oldest, largest, and most well-known MOO." 
Rebecca Spainhower, Virtually Inevitable: Real Problems in Virtual Communities, at 
http://world.std.com/~rs/inevitable.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). "When Pavel Curtis took on 
the project of developing the MOO environment, he gave it a social focus instead of the game 
goal of traditional MUDs." Id. The original site has remained active for over a decade and 
continues to thrive with over 100,000 people having participated in this one virtual world. As a 
result, LambdaMOO is 
a long-standing, ongoing experiment in collective programming and creation, with 
often stunning results that can only be fully appreciated firsthand. Inventions include 
technical objects, such as the lag meter, which provides recent statistics on server load; 
objects serving a mix of practical and metaphorical purposes, such as elevators that 
move users between floors; objects with social uses, such as the birthday meter, where 
users register their birthdays publicly; and objects that just entertain or annoy, such as 
the Cockatoo, a virtual bird who occasionally repeats an utterance recently overheard. 
AT&T Cobot Project, supra (emphasis omitted). Jennifer Mnookin and Rebecca Spainhower 
detail the evolution of the social structure of LambdaMOO. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) 
Law: The Emergence of Law in LambdaMOO, 2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 8 (June 1996), 
at http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issuel/lambda.html; Spainhower, supra. Generally, the MOO 
was administered by a few system administrators (called wizards within the game). Haakon (Pavel 
Curtis's wizard character) drafted a set of guidelines for behavior. When administration became 
too overwhelming for the wizards, they appointed an "Architecture Review Board" of fifteen 
trusted users to allocate space to new users. The wizards were still responsible, however, for 
dealing with unruly users and mediating disputes. In 1993, the wizards turned that responsibility 
over to the community at large by implementing a democratic petitioning and balloting system. 
Since that time, the community has addressed problems of population growth, harassment, and the 
behavior of anonymous guest accounts. 
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watching Court TV?44 The question then becomes whether relevance and 
accreditation of initial utterances of information can itself be produced on a 
peer production model. The answer is that it can. Some of the most 
prominent web-based enterprises, both commercial and noncommercial, 
demonstrate this answer by breaking off precisely the accreditation and 
relevance piece of their product for peer production. Amazon.com and 
Google are good examples in the commercial arena. 
Amazon uses a mix of mechanisms to highlight books and other 
products that its users are likely to buy.45 A number of these mechanisms 
produce relevance and accreditation by harnessing the users themselves. At 
the simplest level, the recommendation "Customers Who Bought Items You 
Recently Viewed Also Bought These Items" is a mechanical means of 
extracting judgments of relevance and accreditation from the collective 
actions of many individuals who produce the datum of relevance as a by- 
product of making their own purchasing decisions. At a more self- 
conscious level (self-conscious, that is, on the part of the user), Amazon 
allows users to create topical lists, and to track other users as their "Friends 
and Favorites," whose decisions they have learned to trust. Amazon also 
provides users with the ability to rate books they buy, generating a peer- 
produced rating by averaging the ratings. The point to take home from 
Amazon is that a corporation that has done immensely well at acquiring and 
retaining customers harnesses peer production to provide one of its salient 
values-its ability to allow users to find things they want quickly and 
efficiently. 
44. Michael Lewis, Faking It, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, ? 6 (Magazine), at 32. 
45. See Amazon.com, at http://www.amazon.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2002) (under the 
"Friends and Favorites" hyperlink). Amazon is constantly testing new methods of peer producing 
relevance and accreditation mechanisms and removing unpopular methods. These include both 
automatically generated and human-made relevance maps. For example, "Page You Made" is 
based on the user's recent clicks on the site and lists a "Featured Item" as well as several "Quick 
Picks," which are products that are similar to the recently viewed items. The page features 
"Listmania" lists, which are user-created topical lists, and a "More To Explore" section that 
provides relevant links to a topical directory of the Amazon inventory. Users can also "Share 
Purchases" and make their purchases available for other users to see. If the user finds a person 
with similar tastes, these options could aid with relevance, and if the user finds a particularly 
trustworthy person, it could aid in accreditation of the product. Amazon also provides discussion 
boards for direct exchange between users. Amazon creates "Purchase Circles," which are "highly 
specialized bestseller lists," based on aggregated data divided either geographically (by town or 
city) or organizationally (by schools, government offices, or corporations). Id. (under the "Friends 
and Favorites" followed by the "Purchase Circles" hyperlinks). The data is analyzed and 
compared to site-wide trends to come up with lists of items that are more popular with that 
particular group than with the general population. If users find a list particularly useful, they can 
bookmark the list to view the changes as the list is updated to reflect new sales data. Amazon 
software also recommends certain products to the user. These "Recommendations" are based on 
items the user has purchased or rated, as well as their activity on the site contrasted with other 
users' activity. As a result, the recommendations can change when the user purchases or reviews 
an item, or when the interests of other consumers change. 
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Similarly, Google, which is widely recognized as the most efficient 
general search engine currently operating, introduced a crucial innovation 
into ranking results that made it substantially better than any of its 
competitors. While Google uses a text-based algorithm to retrieve a given 
universe of web pages initially, its PageRank software employs peer 
production of ranking in the following way.46 The engine treats links from 
other websites pointing to a given website as votes of confidence. 
Whenever one person's page links to another page, that person has stated 
quite explicitly that the linked page is worth a visit. Google's search engine 
counts these links as votes of confidence in the quality of that page as 
compared to other pages that fit the basic search algorithm. Pages that 
themselves are heavily linked-to count as more important votes of 
confidence, so if a highly linked-to site links to a given page, that vote 
counts for more than if an obscure site links to it. By doing this, Google 
harnessed the distributed judgments of many users, with each judgment 
created as a by-product of making his or her own site useful, to produce a 
highly valuable relevance and accreditation algorithm. Google's experience 
is particularly salient when juxtaposed with that of GoTo.com, which was a 
search engine that sold placement on the search result list to the highest 
bidder. It turns out that the site owner's willingness to pay to be seen is not 
necessarily a good measure of the utility its site provided to people who are 
searching the Web. Google recently replaced Overture, GoTo's current 
name, as America Online's (AOL's) default search engine.47 A casual 
search using both will reveal the difference in quality between the two, and 
a search for "Barbie" will also yield interesting insights into the political 
morality of pricing as opposed to voting as the basis of relevance 
algorithms. 
While Google is an automated mechanism of collecting human 
judgment as a by-product of some other activity, there are also important 
examples of distributed projects self-consciously devoted to peer 
production of relevance. Most prominent among these is the Open 
Directory Project (ODP).48 The site relies on tens of thousands of volunteer 
editors to determine which links should be included in the directory. 
Acceptance as a volunteer requires application. Admission relies on a peer 
review process based substantially on seniority and the extent of a 
volunteer's engagement, as measured by the extent of his or her 
contributions. The site is hosted and administered by Netscape, which pays 
for server space and a small number of employees to administer the site and 
set up the initial guidelines, but licensing is free to the number of sites who 
46. See Google, Inc., Our Search: Google Technology, at http://www.google.com/ 
technology/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
47. David F. Gallagher, AOL Shifts Key Contract to Google, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2002, at C4. 
48. Open Directory Project, at http://www.dmoz.org (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
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use ODP as their web directory.49 This presumably adds value to AOL and 
Netscape's commercial search engine and portal as well as enhances the 
company's goodwill. The volunteers are not affiliated with Netscape, 
receive no compensation, and manage the directory out of the joy of doing 
so or for other internal or external motivations. The volunteers spend time 
selecting sites for inclusion in the directory (in small increments of perhaps 
fifteen minutes per site reviewed), thereby producing a comprehensive, 
high-quality, human-edited directory of the Web-competing with, and 
quite possibly outperforming, Yahoo in this category. 
Perhaps the most elaborate multilayer mechanism for peer production 
of relevance and accreditation is Slashdot.50 Billed as "News for Nerds," 
Slashdot primarily consists of users commenting on initial submissions that 
cover a variety of technology-related topics. The submissions are typically 
a link to an off-site story, coupled with some initial commentary from the 
person who submits the piece. Users follow up the initial submission with 
comments that often number in the hundreds. The initial submissions and 
the approach to sifting through the comments of users for relevance and 
accreditation provide a rich example of how this function can be performed 
on a distributed, peer production model. 
It is important initially to understand that the function of posting a story 
from another site onto Slashdot, the first "utterance" in a chain of 
comments on Slashdot, is itself an act of relevance production. The person 
submitting the story is telling the community of Slashdot users, "Here is a 
story that people interested in 'News for Nerds' should be interested in." 
This initial submission of a link is itself filtered by "authors" (really 
editors), most of whom are paid employees of Open Source Development 
Network (OSDN), a corporation that sells advertising on Slashdot and 
customized implementations of the Slash platform. Stories are filtered out if 
they have technical formatting problems or, in principle, if they are poorly 
written or outdated. This segment of the service, then, seems mostly 
traditional-paid employees of the "publisher" decide which stories are, 
and which are not, interesting and of sufficient quality. The only peer 
production element here is the fact that the initial trolling of the web for 
interesting stories is itself performed in a distributed fashion. This 
characterization nonetheless must be tempered, because the filter is 
relatively coarse, as exemplified by the FAQ response to the question, 
"How do you verify the accuracy of Slashdot stories?" A Slashdot editor 
replied: 
49. See Open Directory Project, Sites Using ODP Data, at http://dmoz.org/Computers/ 
Interet/Searching/Directories/Open_Directory_Project/Sites_Using_ODP_Data/ (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2002) (listing the sites that are currently using the ODP). 
50. Open Source Dev. Network, Inc., Slashdot: News for Nerds, Stuff That Matters, at 
http://slashdot.org (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
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We don't. You do. [] If something seems outrageous, we might 
look for some corroboration, but as a rule, we regard this as the 
responsibility of the submitter and the audience. This is why it's 
important to read comments. You might find something that 
refutes, or supports, the story in the main. 
In other words, Slashdot is organized very self-consciously as a means 
of facilitating peer production of accreditation; it is at the comments stage 
that the story undergoes its most important form of accreditation-peer 
review ex post. 
And things do get a lot more interesting as one looks at the comments. 
Slashdot allows the production of commentary on a peer-based model. 
Users submit comments that are displayed together with the initial 
submission of a story. Think of the "content" produced in these comments 
as a cross between academic peer review of journal submissions and a peer- 
produced substitute for television's "talking heads." It is in the means of 
accrediting and evaluating these comments that Slashdot's system provides 
a comprehensive example of peer production of relevance and 
accreditation. 
Slashdot implements an automated system to select moderators from 
the pool of users.52 Moderators are selected according to several criteria: 
They must be logged in (not anonymous), they must be regular users 
(average users, not one-time page loaders or compulsive users), they must 
have been using the site for a while (this defeats people who try to sign up 
just to moderate), they must be willing, and they must have positive 
"karma." Karma is a number assigned to a user that primarily reflects 
whether the user has posted good or bad comments (according to ratings 
from other moderators). If a user meets these criteria, the program assigns 
the user moderator status and the user gets five "influence points" to review 
comments. The moderator rates a comment of his choice using a drop down 
list with words such as "flamebait" and "informative." A positive word 
increases the rating of a comment one point and a negative word decreases 
the rating one point. Each time a moderator rates a comment, it costs the 
moderator one influence point, so the moderator can only rate five 
comments for each moderating period, which lasts for three days. If the user 
does not use the influence points within the period, they expire. The 
moderation setup is designed to give many users a small amount of 
power-thus decreasing the effect of rogue users or users with poor 
judgment. The site also implements some automated "troll filters," which 
51. Open Source Dev. Network, Inc., Slashdot FAQ: Editorial (Oct. 28, 2000), at 
http://slashdot.org/faq/editorial.shtml. 
52. The description in the following few paragraphs is mostly taken from the site's frequently 
asked questions page or from observations. See Open Source Dev. Network, Inc., Slashdot FAQ: 
Comments and Moderation, at http://slashdot.org/faq/com-mod.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2002). 
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prevent users from sabotaging the system. The troll filters prevent users 
from posting more than once every sixty seconds, prevent identical posts, 
and will ban a user for twenty-four hours if the user has been moderated 
down several times within a short time frame. 
Slashdot provides the users with a "threshold" filter that allows each 
user to block lower-quality comments. The scheme uses a numerical rating 
of the comment ranging from -1 to 5. Comments start out at 0 for 
anonymous posters, 1 for registered users, and 2 for registered users with 
good karma. As a result, if a user sets their filter at 1, the user will not see 
any comments from anonymous posters unless the comment's ratings were 
increased by a moderator. A user can set their filter anywhere from -1 
(viewing all of the comments) to 5 (viewing only the comments that have 
been upgraded by several moderators). 
Users also receive accreditation through their karma. If their posts 
consistently receive positive ratings, their karma will increase. At a certain 
karma level, their comments will start off with a rating of 2, thereby giving 
them a louder voice, because other users with a threshold of 2 will now see 
their posts immediately, and fewer upward moderations are needed to push 
their comments even higher. Conversely, a user with bad karma from 
consistently poor ratings can lose accreditation by having their posts 
initially start off at 0 or - 1. At the -1 level, the posts may not get moderated, 
effectively removing the opportunity for the "bad" poster to regain karma. 
Relevance, as distinct from accreditation, is also tied into the Slashdot 
scheme because off-topic posts should receive an "off-topic" rating by the 
moderators and sink below the threshold level (assuming the user has the 
threshold set above the minimum). However, the moderation system is 
limited to choices that sometimes are not mutually exclusive. For instance, 
a moderator may have to choose between "funny" (+1) and "off topic" (-1) 
when a post is both funny and off topic. As a result, an irrelevant post can 
increase in ranking and rise above the threshold level because it is funny or 
informative. It is unclear whether this is a limitation on relevance or rather 
mimics our own normal behavior, say in reading a newspaper or browsing a 
library, where we might let our eyes linger longer on a funny or informative 
tidbit even after we've ascertained that it is not exactly relevant to what we 
were looking for. 
In addition to mechanizing means of selecting moderators and 
minimizing their power to skew the aggregate judgment of the accreditation 
system, Slashdot implements a system of peer review accreditation for the 
moderators themselves. Slashdot implements this "meta-moderation" by 
making any user who has an account from the first ninety percent of 
accounts created on the system eligible to moderate the moderations. Each 
eligible user who opts to perform meta-moderation review is provided with 
ten random opportunities to rate moderators. The randomness helps to 
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prevent biases and control by anyone who might use the assignment process 
to influence the selection of moderators. The user/meta-moderator may rate 
the moderator as either unfair, fair, or neither. The meta-moderation process 
affects the karma of the original moderator, which will remove the 
moderator from the moderation system, if lowered sufficiently. 
Together, these mechanisms allow for the distributed production of 
both relevance and accreditation. Because there are many moderators who 
can moderate any given comment and mechanisms that explicitly limit the 
power of any one moderator to overinfluence the aggregate judgment, the 
system evens out differences in evaluation by aggregating judgments. The 
system then allows individual users to determine what level of accreditation 
fits their particular time and needs by setting their filter to be more or less 
inclusive. By introducing karma, the system also allows users to build 
reputation over time and to gain greater control over the accreditation of 
their own work relative to the power of the critics. Users, moderators, and 
meta-moderators are all volunteers. Slashdot demonstrates that the same 
dynamic that we observed for peer production of content can be 
implemented to produce relevance and accreditation. Rather than using the 
full-time effort of professional accreditation experts, the system is designed 
to permit the aggregation of many small judgments, each of which entails a 
trivial effort for the contributor. The software that mediates communication 
among the collaborating peers also contains a variety of mechanisms 
designed to defend the common effort from poor judgment or defection. 
C. Value-Added Distribution 
After considering content production along with relevance and 
accreditation mechanisms, there remains the question of "distribution." To 
some extent this is a nonissue on the Interet. Distribution is cheap; all one 
needs is a server and large pipes connecting the server to the world, and 
anyone, anywhere, can get the information. I mention it here for two 
reasons. First, there are a variety of value-adding activities that need to be 
done at the distribution stage-like proofreading in print publication. 
Although the author who placed the content on the Web will likely, for the 
same motivations that caused him or her to put the materials together in the 
first place, seek to ensure these distribution values, we have very good 
examples of value-adding activities at the distribution stage being produced 
on a peer production model. Second, as the Interet is developing, the 
largest Interet Service Providers (ISPs) are trying to differentiate their 
services by providing certain distribution-related values. The most obvious 
examples are caching and mirroring-implementations by the ISP (caching) 
or a third party like Akamai (mirroring) that insert themselves into the 
distribution chain in order to make some material more easily accessible 
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than other material.53 The question is the extent to which peer distribution 
can provide similar or substitute values. 
The most notorious example is Napster.54 The collective availability of 
tens of millions of hard drives of individual users provided a substantially 
more efficient distribution system for a much wider variety of songs than 
the centralized (and hence easier to control) distribution systems preferred 
by the recording industry. The point here is not to sing the praises of the 
dearly departed (as of this writing) Napster. Setting aside the issue of 
content ownership, efficient distribution could be offered by individuals for 
individuals. Instead of any one corporation putting funds into building and 
maintaining a large server, end-users opened part of their hard drives to 
make content available to others. Although Napster required a central 
addressing system to connect these hard drives, Gnutella and other 
emerging peer-to-peer networks do not.55 This is not the place to go into the 
debate over whether Gnutella has its own limitations, be they scalability or 
free-riding.56 The point is that there are both volunteers and commercial 
software companies involved in developing software intended to allow 
users to set up a peer-based distribution system that will be independent of 
the more commercially controlled distribution systems, operating from the 
edges of the network to its edges,57 rather than through a controlled 
middle.58 
53. Part of the time lag involved in downloading materials is the time it takes for the 
materials to traverse the network from their point of origin to the user's computer. One approach 
to speeding up communications is to store copies of popular materials close to users. When 
Internet Service Providers do this, the function is called "caching," which relates to temporary 
storage of recently viewed files. See David D. Clark & Marjorie Blumenthal, Rethinking the 
Design of the Internet: The End to End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, Paper Presented at 
the Policy Implications of End-to-End Workshop, Stanford University, Dec. 1, 2000, at 15 (Aug. 
10, 2000), at http://lawschool.stanford.edu/e2e/papers/TPRC-Clark-Blumenthal.pdf. Akamai is a 
business that provides similar functionality, allowing content providers to purchase the 
functionality independently of the decisions of an ISP. See AKAMAI, TURBO-CHARGING 
DYNAMIC WEBSITES WITH AKAMAI EDGESUITE (2001), at http://www.akamai.com/en/ 
resources/pdf/Turbocharging_WP.pdf. So, for example, if CNN wants to be served quickly, but 
AT&T Worldnet is not caching CNN, CNN can use the services of Akamai to "mirror" its site in 
many important local markets so that whoever accesses the materials will receive more rapid 
service. 
54. See generally Salon Media Group, at http://dir.salon.com/topics/napster/ (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2002) (collecting a variety of stories and explanations of the rise and fall of said dearly 
departed). 
55. See Andy Oram, Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation, 
O'REILLY NETWORK, May 12, 2000, at 3, at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2000/05/ 
12/magazine/gnutella.html. 
56. See Eytan Adar & Berardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 FIRST MONDAY 1 
(Oct. 2, 2000), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/. But see Clay Shirky, In 
Praise of Free Loaders, O'REILLY NETWORK, Dec. 1, 2000, at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/ 
a/p2p/2000/12/01/shirky_freeloading.html (contesting Adar and Huberman's argument). 
57. See Clay Shirky, Communities, Audiences, and Scale, at http://www.shirky.com/writings/ 
community_scale.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). 
58. Eben Moglen has argued that peer distribution is dramatically better than proprietary 
distribution, because social familiarity allows people to better guess their friends' and 
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Perhaps the most interesting, discrete, and puzzling (for anyone who 
dislikes proofreading) instantiation of a peer-based distribution function is 
Project Gutenberg and the site set up to support it, Distributed Proofreaders. 
Project Gutenberg59 is a collaboration of hundreds of volunteers who scan 
in and correct books so that they are freely available in digital form. 
Currently, Project Gutenberg has amassed around 6300 public domain e- 
texts through the efforts of volunteers and makes the collection available to 
everyone for free.60 The e-texts are offered in ASCII format, which is the 
lowest common denominator, making it possible to reach the widest 
audience, but Project Gutenberg does not discourage volunteers from also 
offering the e-texts in markup languages. It contains a search engine that 
allows a reader to search for typical fields, such as subject, author, and title. 
Distributed Proofreaders is a site that supports Project Gutenberg by 
allowing volunteers to proofread an e-text by comparing it to scanned 
images of the original book. The site is maintained and administered by one 
person. 
Project Gutenberg volunteers can select any book in the public domain 
to transform into an e-text. The volunteer submits a copy of the title page of 
the book to Michael Hart-who founded the project-for copyright 
research. The volunteer is notified to proceed if the book passes the 
copyright clearance. The decision on which book to convert to e-text is thus 
left up to the volunteer, subject to copyright limitations. Typically, a 
volunteer converts a book to ASCII format using OCR (optical character 
recognition) and proofreads it one time in order to screen it for major errors. 
The volunteer then passes the ASCII file to a volunteer proofreader. This 
exchange is orchestrated with very little supervision. The volunteers use a 
listserv mailing list and a bulletin board to initiate and supervise the 
exchange. In addition, books are labeled with a version number indicating 
how many times they have been proofed. The site encourages volunteers to 
proof books that have low numbers. The Project Gutenberg proofing 
process is simple and involves looking at the text itself and examining it for 
errors. The proofreaders (aside from the first pass) are not expected to have 
access to the book or scanned images, but merely review the e-text for self- 
evident errors. 
acquaintances' preferences than a centralized distributor. If individuals are provided with the 
freedom to give their friends music or any form of utterance that they believe they will like, the 
information will arrive in the hands of most everyone who would want it within a very small 
number of steps. Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto: How Culture Became Property and 
What We're Going To Do About It, Lecture at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
(Nov. 8, 2001), at http://www.ibiblio.org/moglen (video stream). 
59. Project Gutenberg, at http://promo.net/pg/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2002). 
60. See Ibiblio.org, at http://www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/GUTINDEX.ALL (last visited Sept. 
24, 2002) (including multiple versions of the same books as separate e-texts). 
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Distributed Proofreaders,61 a site unaffiliated with Project Gutenberg, is 
devoted to proofing Project Gutenberg e-texts more efficiently by 
distributing the volunteer proofreading function in smaller and more 
information-rich modules. In the Distributed Proofreaders process, scanned 
pages are stored on the site and volunteers are shown a scanned page and a 
page of the e-text simultaneously so that the volunteer can compare the e- 
text to the original page. Because of the fine-grained modularity, 
proofreaders can proof one or a few pages and submit them. By contrast, 
the entire book is typically exchanged on the Project Gutenberg site, or at 
minimum a chapter. In this fashion, Distributed Proofreaders clears the 
proofing of thousands of pages every month. 
Interestingly, these sites show that even the most painstaking, some 
might say mundane, jobs can be produced on a distributed model. Here the 
motivation problem may be particularly salient, but it appears that a 
combination of bibliophilia and community ties suffices (both sites are 
much smaller and more tightly knit than, for example, the Linux kernel 
development community). Individuals can self-identify as having a passion 
for a particular book or as having the time and inclination to proofread as 
part of a broader project they perceive to be in the public good. By 
connecting a very large number of people to these potential opportunities to 
produce, the e-text projects, just like Clickworkers, Slashdot, or Amazon, 
can capitalize on an enormous pool of underutilized intelligent human 
creativity and willingness to engage in intellectual effort. 
D. Summary 
What I hope these examples provide is a common set of mental pictures 
of peer production. In the remainder of the Article, I will abstract from 
these stories some general observations about peer production: what makes 
it work and what makes it better under certain circumstances than market- 
or hierarchy-based production. But at this point it is important that the 
stories have established the plausibility of, or piqued your interest in, the 
claim that peer production is an existing phenomenon of much wider 
application than free software. What remains is the interesting and difficult 
task of explaining the phenomenon so as to begin to think about the policy 
implications of the emergence of this strange breed in the middle of our 
information economy. I will by no stretch of the imagination claim to have 
completed this task in the following pages, but I hope to identify some basic 
regularities and organizing conceptions that will be useful to anyone 
interested in pursuing the answer. Even if you do not buy a single word of 
61. Distributed Proofreaders, at http://charlz.dns2go.com/gutenberg/ (last visited Aug. 31, 
2002). 
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my initial efforts to theorize the phenomenon, however, seeing these 
disparate phenomena as instances of a general emerging phenomenon in the 
organization of information production should present a rich topic of study 
for organization theorists, anthropologists, institutional economists, and 
business people interested in understanding new production models in a 
ubiquitously networked environment. 
II. WHY WOULD PEER PRODUCTION EMERGE IN A 
NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT? 
A. Locating the Theoretical Spacefor Peer Production 
There are many places to attempt to provide a theoretical explanation of 
peer production. One option would be to focus on the organization-of- 
production literature that would be most sympathetic to the sustainability 
and productivity of peer production. This might include the literature 
regarding trust-based modes of organizing production62 or literature that 
focuses on internal motivation and its role in knowledge production.63 
Perhaps it makes sense to focus on cultural or sociological characteristics of 
peer communities as a central explanation of peer production, starting with 
mainstream sociological and anthropological literature of gift-giving and 
reciprocity.64 There are applications that are rather close both online65 and 
offline,66 as well as in economic analysis of organization.67 The advantage 
62. See, e.g., Paul S. Adler, Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the 
Future of Capitalism, 12 ORG. SCI. 215 (2001). 
63. See, e.g., Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Organizational Forms, 11 ORG. SCI. 538 (2000). 
64. A very early exploration of gift exchange is Franz Boas, The Social Organization and the 
Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL MUSEUM 
FOR 1895, at 311 (1897), available at http://www.canadiana.org/cgi-bin/ECO/mtq?doc=14300. 
The locus classicus is MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN 
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (1925). Valuable insight is also 
provided by Marshall D. Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in THE RELEVANCE OF 
MODELS FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 139 (Michael Banton ed., 1965) and CLAUDE LEVI- 
STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (James Harle Bell et al. trans., Beacon 
Press 1969) (1967). 
65. Indeed, this is central to Raymond's discussion of open source development, see 
RAYMOND, supra note 2, though it is not entirely clear that his description in fact fits the gift 
literature, given how distant and potentially disconnected the act of giving in open source 
communities is from the act of receiving. 
66. In the offline world, the academic community has been described as thriving on shared 
social commitments to the pursuit of truth, progress, and open collaboration. Science in particular 
has been the subject of sociological analysis of a productive enterprise. Classics are BERNARD 
BARBER, SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1952), WARREN O. HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC 
COMMUNITY (1965), and ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973). Studies of 
gift exchange flow from the 1925 fountainhead of Marcel Mauss. See MAUSS, supra note 64. 
Work in this vein has followed both in anthropology and sociology. For a review of this literature 
and its application to current debates over patenting basic research, see Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating 
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of doing so would be that these approaches have rich and detailed analytic 
tools with which to analyze the phenomenon of peer production. The 
disadvantage is that these approaches are outside the mainstream of 
economic theory, which in turn looms large in discussions of law and 
policy. In this early study of the phenomenon of peer production, it seems 
more important to establish its baseline plausibility as a sustainable and 
valuable mode of production within the most widely used relevant analytic 
framework than to offer a detailed explanation of its workings. Doing so 
should provide wider recognition of the policy implications and create a 
space for more methodologically diverse inquiries. 
At the most general level, we can begin by looking at Ronald Coase's 
explanation of the firm in The Nature of the Firm and Harold Demsetz's 
explanation of property rights in Toward a Theory of Property Rights.68 
Coase's basic explanation of the emergence and relative prevalence of firms 
focuses on the comparative costs of institutional alternatives. In other 
words, Coase asked why clusters of individuals operate under the direction 
of an entrepreneur, a giver of commands, rather than interacting purely 
under the guidance of prices, and answered that using the price system is 
costly. Where the cost of achieving a given outcome in the world through 
the price system will be higher than the cost of using a firm to achieve the 
same result, firms will emerge. Any given firm will cease to grow when the 
increased complexity of its organization makes its internal decision costs 
higher than the costs that a smaller firm would incur to achieve the same 
marginal result. Firms will not, however, conduct activities if the cost of 
organizing these activities within a firm exceeds the cost of achieving that 
result through the market. Assuming that the cost of organization increases 
Scientific Research. Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 
(1999). 
67. This is not to say that there is no literature within economics that attempts to use the gift- 
exchange literature to study economic phenomena. Examples are George A. Akerlof, Labor 
Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543 (1982) and Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal 
Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830 (1996). See also JANET TAI LANDA, 
The Enigma of the Kula Ring, in TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT- 
EXCHANGE 141 (1994); Ernst Fehr et al., When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift 
Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 324 (1998). 
The past few years have seen a particular emphasis on studying reciprocity itself as an 
economic phenomenon. DAN M. KAHAN, THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: A THEORY OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND LAW (forthcoming 2002); see also ERNST FEHR & KLAUS M. 
SCHMIDT, THEORIES OF FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 
(Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 75, 2001), at http://www.unizh.ch/cgi- 
bin/iew/pubdb2; BRUNO S. FREY & STEPHAN MEIER, PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, RECIPROCITY, OR 
BOTH? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 107, 2002), at 
http://www.unizh.ch/cgi-bin/iew/pubdb2; Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of 
Incentives, Schumpeter Lecture at the Annual Conference of the European Economic Association 
(Nov. 2001), at http://www.unizh.ch/cgi-bin/iew/pubdb2. 
68. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
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with size, Coase posited that we have a "natural"-i.e., internal to the 
theory-limit on the size and number of organizations. 
Demsetz's basic explanation of why property emerges with regard to 
resources that previously were managed without property rights-as 
commons-is based on a very similar rationale. As long as the cost of 
implementing and enforcing property rights in a given resource is higher 
than the value of the increase in the efficiency of utilization of the resource 
gained by the introduction of a property regime, the resource will operate 
without property rights. An increase in the value of the resource due to an 
exogenous circumstance, such as a technological development or an 
encounter with another civilization, may create a sufficient incentive for 
property rights to emerge. More generally, property in a resource emerges if 
the social cost of having no property in that resource exceeds the social cost 
of implementing a property system in it. This restatement can include 
common property regimes, managed commons, and other nonproperty 
approaches to managing sustainable commons.69 
Table 1 describes the interaction between Coase's theory of the firm 
and Demsetz's theory of property. 
TABLE 1. IDEAL ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS AS A FUNCTION OF 
RELATIVE SOCIAL COST 
Markets Commons 
effi cient th n ark ........   . F C om m on property 
regimes 
1 A property system is "valuable" as compared to the option, and opportunity 
costs, of not having property rights in place. The concept of the "value" of a 
property system in the first column is equivalent to the "opportunity cost" of a 
property system in the second column. 
Both markets and firms generally rely on property rights. Therefore, the 
institutions described in this column reflect functional equivalents for 
decentralized exchange-markets-and coordinating organization-firms-in the 
absence of property. 
69. For discussions of commons, see OSTROM, supra note 17; and Rose, supra note 17. A 
brief discussion of these concepts as applied to peer production follows below. See infra notes 
112-120 and accompanying text. 
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Before going into why peer production may be less costly than 
property/market-based production or organizational production, it is 
important to recognize that if we posit the existence of such a third option it 
is relatively easy to adapt the transaction-costs theory of the firm and the 
comparative institutional cost theory of property to include it. We would 
say that when the cost of organizing an activity on a peered basis is lower 
than the cost of using the market or hierarchical organization, then peer 
production will emerge.70 
We could tabulate as follows: 
TABLE 2. IDEAL ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS AS A FUNCTION OF 
RELATIVE SOCIAL COST INCLUDING PEER PRODUCTION 
MarkelIIt 
exchange of x Markets Commons 
more efficient thn
(Farmers markets) (Ideas & facts; roads) 
lillllililSB/, , , , , ,r, , , egis , 
....... 
~ 
?,:, ... ...::!,, )ii: 
ii, 
:~g~;]: ,; , . , . ........... 
efficient than market Firms Common property 
(Automobiles; shoes) exchg|a||:gegorpeering| of x (Swiss pastures) 
Ei-.. ..i.-.-- ..i--- . . E.. . . .. ......... .......i...-i.-E.............. 
Pcr~ing ox ~i ~ Proprietary "open source" Peer production 
. efforts processes. 
ormrket xangc of , x -, -(Xerox's Eureka) (NASA Clickworkers) 
"Cost" here would include the negative effects of intellectual property on 
dissemination and downstream productive use. 
Understanding that the same framework that explains the emergence of 
property and firms could, in principle, also explain the emergence of peer 
production focuses our effort on trying to understand why it is that peering 
emergence of peer production seems to be tied to the emergence of a 
pervasively networked information economy, my explanation seeks to be in 
some sense sensitive to (1) changes in the special characteristics of the 
human and material resources used in information production relative to 
70. In the context of land, Ellickson extends Demsetz's analysis in precisely this fashion, 
suggesting that there may be a variety of reasons supporting group ownership of larger tracts, 
including the definition of efficient boundaries, coping with significant shocks to the resource 
pool, risk spreading, and the "advent of inexpensive video cameras or other technologies for 
monitoring behavior within a group setting." Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1315, 1330, 1332-44 (1993). 
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other productive enterprises and (2) the cost and efficiency of 
communication among human participants in the productive enterprise. 
B. Peer Production of Information in a Pervasively 
Networked Environment 
Peer production is emerging as an important mode of information 
production because of four attributes of the pervasively networked 
information economy. First, the object of production-information-is 
quirky as an object of economic analysis, in that it is purely nonrival,71 and 
its primary nonhuman input is the same public good as its output- 
information.72 Second, the physical capital costs of information production 
have declined dramatically with the introduction of cheap processor-based 
computer networks. Third, the primary human input-creative talent-is 
highly variable, more than traditional labor and certainly more than many 
material resources usually central to production. Moreover, the individuals 
who are the "input" possess better information than anyone else about the 
suitability of their talents and their level of motivation and focus at a given 
moment to given production tasks. Fourth, and finally, communication and 
information exchange across space and time are much cheaper and more 
efficient than ever before, which permits the coordination of widely 
distributed potential sources of creative effort and the aggregation of actual 
distributed effort into usable end products. 
The first attribute-the public goods nature of information-affects the 
cost of one major input into production-existing information. It means that 
the social cost of using existing information as an input into new 
information production is zero.73 This has two effects on the relative cost of 
peer production of information.74 First, it lowers the expected private cost 
71. A good is nonrival to the extent that its consumption by one person does not diminish its 
availability for use by any other person. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological 
Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S73-S74 (1990). It has been commonplace for a long time to treat 
information as a perfectly nonrival good. See id.; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare 
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616-17 (1962). 
72. While the input characteristic of information has been appreciated at least since 1962, 
Arrow, supra note 71, the extensive exploration of the implications of this characteristic largely 
begins with Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and 
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991). 
73. Saying that the social cost of its use by one person is zero is simply another way of saying 
that the good is nonrival-that its use by one person does not prevent its use by any other person. 
74. The public goods aspect of information production is usually described as being 
comprised of two distinct characteristics, its nonrivalry and its nonexcludability. See Romer, 
supra note 71, at S73-S74. A good is excludable to the extent that its producer can exclude others 
from its use unless they pay. If a good is not excludable, it too presents a problem for market 
provisioning, not because it is inefficient to price it above zero, but because it is difficult to do so, 
and hence firms will provide too little of it. Nonexcludability of information is less important to 
the analysis here, because it does not relate to the characteristics of information that are important 
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of peer production of information, as compared to normal economic goods, 
because in principle it means that a central input-preexisting 
information-could be available to human productive agents without limit, 
if the provisioning problem can be solved without introducing 
appropriation. Second, it underlies a pervasive social cost of market and 
hierarchy in this field of production because of the losses in both static and 
dynamic efficiency entailed by the implementation of property rights in a 
nonrival public good usually thought necessary to sustain market and 
hierarchy-based production of information.75 
The second attribute-the decline in physical capital cost-similarly 
lowers the cost of another major cost of information production. The age of 
mechanical reproduction that enabled fixation and distribution of 
information and culture as goods was defined by the high cost of physical 
capital. Large circulation automated printing presses, vinyl record and later 
CD manufacturing facilities, and movie studios and their celluloid-based 
systems formed the basis for the industrial model typical of information and 
cultural production in the twentieth century. The declining cost of computer 
processors coupled with the digitization of all forms of information and 
culture has made the necessary physical capital cheaper by orders of 
magnitude than in the past. 
Together, these first two attributes make information production a 
potentially sustainable low-cost, low-returns endeavor for many individuals 
relying on indirect appropriation.76 It is important to note, however, that the 
public goods attribute limits the applicability of my observations about peer 
production, so that I make no claim about the applicability of these 
observations to traditional economic goods. 
The third characteristic-the centrality of human capital to information 
production and its variability-is the primary source of efficiency gains 
from moving from markets or hierarchical organization to peering. 
Commons-based peer production creates better information about available 
to making peer production both feasible and efficient-that its most efficient price is zero and that 
it can be used by any number of people without diminishing its availability for others. 
75. See Arrow, supra note 71, at 617 ("[P]recisely to the extent that [property rights in 
information] are successful, there is an underutilization of the information."). 
76. "Indirect appropriation" is appropriation of the value of one's effort by means other than 
reliance on the excludability of the product of the effort. For example, someone who is paid as a 
teacher but gets the position in reliance on his scholarship is indirectly appropriating the benefit of 
his scholarship. An IBM engineer who gains human capital by working on GNU/Linux from 
home in the evening is indirectly appropriating the benefits of her efforts in participating in the 
production of GNU/Linux. The term is intended to separate out appropriation that is sensitive to 
excludability of information-direct appropriation through intellectual property-and 
appropriation that is independent of exclusion from the information-indirect appropriation 
without intellectual property. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of 
Information Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 87-88 (2002). As a general matter, the 
more a sector of information production can be sustained through indirect appropriation, the less it 
needs intellectual property. 
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human capital and can better allocate creative effort to resources and 
projects. 
The fourth attribute-the dramatic decline in communications costs- 
radically reduces the cost of peering relative to its cost in the material 
world. This allows substantially cheaper movement of information inputs to 
human beings, human talent to resources, and modular contributions to 
projects, so that widely dispersed contributions can be integrated into 
finished information goods. It also allows communication among 
participants in peer production enterprises about who is doing what and 
what needs to be done. 
C. Markets, Hierarchies, and Peer Production as 
Information-Processing Systems 
Usually, the question of why anyone would contribute to a peer 
production enterprise without directly appropriating the benefits is foremost 
in people's minds when I describe the phenomenon. For the sake of 
completeness of the organization-theory argument, however, suspend 
disbelief for one more section (or if you cannot do so, read Part III first, and 
then come back here). Assume for the next ten pages that I have come up 
with a reasonably plausible story as to why people participate, which will 
allow us to consider the claim that if they did, their efforts would be more 
productive than if they organized in a firm or interacted purely through a 
price system. 
Peer production has a relative advantage over firm- or market-based 
production along two dimensions, both a function of the highly variable 
nature of human capital. The first emerges when one treats all approaches 
to organizing production as mechanisms by which individual agents reduce 
uncertainty as to the likely value of various courses of productive action.77 
Differences among these modes in terms of their information-processing 
characteristics could then account for differences in their relative value as 
mechanisms for organizing production. The second dimension consists of 
77. Individuals who are presented with alternatives from which to choose, such as standing in 
a particular spot and turning a lever all day or writing an economic analysis of friendship, do not 
always know which of these courses of action is more valuable or which would allow them to put 
dinner on the table. One can think of markets and firms as means by which individuals solve this 
lack of knowledge, because they use signals about which action will better fulfill their purposes- 
be they glory or subsistence. What follows, then, is in some measure a sketchy application of 
Herbert Simon's statement: "It is only because individual human beings are limited in knowledge, 
foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful instruments for the achievement of human 
purpose .... " HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 199 (1957). This individual-centric view of 
organization treats the firm solely in terms related to the question of why agents use this form of 
organization to order their individual productive behavior. I do not differentiate between 
entrepreneurs, managers, and employees, but rather treat all of them as agents who have a set of 
possible open courses of action. 
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allocation efficiencies gained from the absence of property. A particular 
strategy that firms, and to a lesser extent markets, use to reduce uncertainty 
is securing access to limited sets of agents and resources through contract 
and property. This strategy entails a systematic loss of allocation efficiency 
relative to peer production, because there are increasing returns to scale for 
the size of the sets of agents and resources available to be applied to 
projects and peer production relies on unbounded access of agents to 
resources and projects. 
1. Information Gains 
We could reduce the decisions that must be made by productive human 
beings as follows. Imagine a human agent (A), who is deciding whether and 
how to act. An action (a) is a combination of two elements: the effort (e) to 
be exercised and the resources (r) as to which the effort is exercised. An 
agent sees a range of actions open to him that is a function of the range of 
resources and effort levels that he can utilize. As information-collection 
costs decline, agents see more of the universe of opportunities for action 
that are available to them. Imagine that A is a rational actor,78 where the 
private value (VA) to A of doing a is the expected value of the outcome (OA), 
which is the value to A of OA obtaining, discounted by the probability that 
OA will obtain if A does a. This means that the value to A of doing a 
increases as the probability that doing a will result in OA obtaining 
increases. That probability depends on the effort A will exert; the resources 
available to A; A's talent (t), where talent describes relative capabilities, 
associations, and idiosyncratic insights and educational mixes of an 
individual that make that person more or less productive with a given set of 
resources for a given project; the presence of complementary actions by 
other agents; and the absence of undermining actions by other agents. 
A will do an using (en, rn) if A believes the value VAn to be higher than 
either inaction or an alternative action. This requires that VAn be positive 
relative to the value of inaction and higher than the value VAm-the value of 
any other OAm similarly discounted by the probability that any other am, 
combining any (em, rm), will lead to OAm obtaining. It is important to 
underscore that the probability of OA obtaining is in some measure 
dependent on the actions, both complementary and undermining, of other 
78. A rational actor in the most traditional sense can be formalized within a framework that 
strictly orders the value of outcomes of actions performed by agents who can calculate the values 
of their preferences, outcomes, and the probabilities of outcomes vis-a-vis actions. For the limited 
purposes of comparing the information-processing characteristics of firms, markets, and peer 
production, these rather strong characteristics are not necessary. It is enough to have individuals 
that, in Simon's terms, are satisficers. See id. at 204-05. The uncertainty as to the relative value of 
a given action must be reduced to a level that satisfies the actor's requirements to justify action, 
without needing to calculate fully the various outcomes. 
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agents. Assuming that the agent knows his or her own valuation of the 
outcome, has some experience-based evaluation of t, and controls his or her 
own effort, e, uncertainty resides primarily with regard to the divergence of 
the private valuation of the outcome from its valuation by others, the 
availability of r, and the interdependence of the agent's action on the action 
or inaction of others outside A's control. Reducing these uncertainties is a 
central function of markets and firms. Reducing the latter two in particular 
is a central function of property and contract, which can secure 
complementary material and human resources to increase the probability 
that complementary actions will be taken and decrease the probability that 
undermining actions will occur. 
Markets and firm-based hierarchies are information processes in the 
sense that they are means of reducing the uncertainty that agents face in 
evaluating different courses of action to a level acceptable to the agent as 
warranting action. Markets price different levels of effort and resources to 
signal the relative values of actions in a way that allows individuals to 
compare actions and calculate the likely actions of other individuals faced 
with similar pricing of alternative courses of action. Firms reduce 
uncertainty by specifying to some individuals what actions to take, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty of interdependent action to a level acceptable to 
the agents by delegating to the managers control over enough resources and 
people by contract and property. 
To compare modes of organizing production as information-processing 
systems one might use the term information opportunity cost. I use the term 
"information" here in the technical sense of a reduction in uncertainty, 
where "perfect information" is the condition where uncertainty regarding an 
action could not be further reduced in principle. Perfect information is 
impossible to acquire, and different organizational modes have different 
strategies for overcoming this persistent uncertainty. These strategies differ 
from each other in the amount and kind of information they lose in the 
process of resolving the uncertainty that rational agents face. The 
divergence of each mode from the hypothetical condition of perfect 
information-its lossiness-is that mode's information opportunity cost. 
Markets reduce uncertainty regarding allocation decisions by producing 
a signal that is clear and comparable across different uses as to which use of 
the relevant factors would be most efficient. To do so, markets require a 
codification of the attributes of different levels of effort, different kinds of 
resources, and different attributes of outcomes, so that these can all be 
specified as contract terms to which a price is affixed. An example of this 
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was the introduction of codified standards for commodities as an 
indispensable element of the emergence of commodities markets.79 
Since we are concerned with individual agents' decisions, and levels 
and focuses of effort are a major component of individual action, it is 
intuitive that specification and pricing of all aspects of individual effort as 
they change in small increments over the span of an individual's full day, 
let alone a month, is impossible.80 What we get instead is codification of 
effort types-a garbage collector, a law professor-that are priced more or 
less finely. But one need only look at the relative homogeneity of law firm 
starting salaries as compared to the high variability of individual ability and 
motivation levels of graduating law students to realize that pricing of 
individual effort can be quite crude. These attributes are also difficult to 
monitor and verify over time, though perhaps not quite as difficult as 
predicting them ex ante, so that pricing continues to be a function of 
relatively crude information about the actual variability among people. 
More importantly, as aspects of performance that are harder fully to specify 
in advance or monitor-like creativity over time given the occurrence of 
new opportunities to be creative-become more important, market 
mechanisms become more lossy. 
Markets are particularly good at resolving the uncertainties with regard 
to the difference in valuation of the outcome among different agents. 
Therefore, an agent acting on a market price will have a relatively certain 
evaluation of the external valuation of the outcome. Of course, this 
valuation may be flawed because of externalities not reflected in the price, 
but (for better or worse, depending on the magnitude and shape of 
exteralities) markets plainly reduce uncertainty about the value of an 
action as perceived by others. Markets also reduce the uncertainty about the 
availability of resources, by allowing an agent to compare the value of an 
outcome to the price of necessary resources. Finally, markets reduce 
uncertainties with regard to the actions of other agents in two ways. First, 
agents can evaluate the risk that others will act in a way that is detrimental, 
or fail to act in a way that is complementary, to the agent's action, given the 
relative pricing of the courses of complementary or detrimental action. This 
risk assessment can then be built into the perceived value of a possible 
79. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 211 (1977) (describing how commodity attributes became codified, and 
local variability squelched, as a part of the transition to commodity markets). 
80. In the context of the market for labor, this has sometimes been called the multitask 
problem-the inability to specify completely by contract all the tasks required and all the 
attributes of an employee who will likely need to perform multiple tasks. Bengt Holmstrom & 
Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and 
Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991) (Special Issue); see also Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm 
as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 89 (1999) ("The fact that [job] contingencies are 
hard to specify ex ante makes the firm a potentially important operator of an internal human 
capital market."). 
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action. Second, agents can maintain property rights in resources and 
projects to prevent negatively correlated actions81 and contract with other 
individuals to provide relatively secure access to resources for 
complementary action. 
Firms or hierarchical organizations resolve uncertainty by instituting an 
algorithm or process by which information about which actions to follow is 
ordered, so that some pieces of information count as a sufficient reduction 
in uncertainty about the correct course of action to lead agents who receive 
them to act. The mythical entrepreneur (or the historical manager) becomes 
the sole source of information that is relevant to reducing the uncertainty of 
the workers in a purely managed firm. In the ideal-type firm, uncertainty as 
to which of a set of actions will increase an agent's welfare is reduced by 
fixing a salary for following a manager's orders and shifting some of the 
risk of that course of action from employees to employers. Production 
processes-if I stand here and twist this lever all day, cars will emerge from 
the other side and I will get a paycheck-are codified as instruction sets. 
Agents reduce their uncertainty about why to act and what to do by 
reducing the universe of information they deem relevant to their decision. 
Information that arrives through a particular channel with a particular level 
of authorization counts as a signal, and all the rest counts as noise. It 
remains to the entrepreneur (in the pure model of the firm)82 to be the 
interface between the firm and the market and to translate one set of 
uncertainty-reducing signals-prices-to another set of signals with similar 
effect-organizational commands. 
By controlling a set of resources through property and commanding a 
set of agents through the employment relationship, the firm reduces the 
elements of uncertainty related to the interdependence of the actions of 
81. Maintaining rights in what I call "projects" is, on Kitch's now-classic reading, the 
primary function of the patent system. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). Even if one is critical of Kitch's almost exclusive focus on 
this characteristic as the reason for the patent system, recognizing that patents provide some 
measure of control over projects is all that is necessary here. The derivative use right in copyright 
plays a similar function to a more limited extent. 
82. A number of readers have complained that this picture of the firm is too thin to be a 
realistic and complete description. Firms use all sorts of market-based mechanisms like incentive 
compensation and internal arm's length bargaining among units and mix market-based and 
hierarchical control mechanisms to organize production. The point of my description, however, is 
not to present a true sociological description of production in a firm. Coase's transaction costs 
theory of the firm identifies two dimensions to the process of allocating resources-pricing and 
managerial commands-making it possible to map different organizations according to whether 
and how they mix these ideal-type modes of coordinating the use of resources in production. I 
present these two ideal types in their ideal form here, so as to clarify what is different about peer 
production. Within this theory, peer production emerges as a third ideal type, to create a three- 
dimensional space within which an organizational model can be described. In this model, 
employee-of-the-month programs and employee-feedback sessions become simple precursors to 
hybrids between firms and peer production processes, the most obvious example of which is 
presented by Xerox's Eureka. 
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agents. But by doing so it creates a boundary around the set of available 
agents and the set of available resources that limits the information 
available about what other agents could have done with these same 
resources or what else these agents could have done with other resources. 
This boundary therefore limits the efficacy of information-collection 
mechanisms-like incentive-based contracts-that firms use to overcome 
the difficulty of collecting information to which their employees have 
special access.83 
The point to see is that like the price system, hierarchical organization 
is a lossy medium. All the information that could have been relevant to the 
decision regarding each factor of production but that was not introduced in 
a form or at a location that entitled it to "count" toward an agent's decision 
is lost. Much of the knowledge-management movement in business schools 
and punditry since the mid-1990s has been concerned with mitigating the 
lossiness of managerial hierarchy as an information-processing 
mechanism.84 Mitigating this lossiness is the primary job of CIOs.85 
An example where peer production-proprietary, not commons- 
based-was used precisely to solve the lossiness of hierarchical 
organization is Xerox's Eureka system for organizing the flow of questions 
from, and answers to, field technicians about failures of photocopiers.86 The 
firm created a decentralized communications system for technicians to post 
questions, a peer review system for other technicians to answer these 
questions, and a database library of past questions and answers available to 
technicians who confront new problems. The original approach toward 
technical failures of machines was to use manuals that came with the 
machines, because the machine was conceptualized as being completely 
engineered by the engineers, with all the possible failures specified in the 
manual. Technicians were thus conceived of as instruction followers, who 
came to machines that were broken, diagnosed the problem by locating it in 
the manual, and then solved it by executing a series of corrective steps 
prescribed by the manual. 
83. Another problem with incentive-based contracts is that they may undermine voluntary 
cooperation, a phenomenon related to the relationship between the presence of money and social- 
psychological rewards discussed infra notes 101-105. See ERNST FEHR & SIMON GACHTER, DO 
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS UNDERMINE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION? (Inst. for Empirical Research 
in Econ., Working Paper No. 34, 2002), at http://www.unizh.ch/cgi-bin/iew/pubdb2. 
84. For a range of definitions of knowledge management and a taste of the analytic styles, see 
Brint.com, What Is Knowledge Management?, at http://www.brint.com/km/kmdefs.htm (last 
visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
85. CIOs are "Chief Information Officers," a position created to reduce information loss 
within organizations. 
86. See Daniel G. Bobrow et al., Community Knowledge Sharing in Practice, at 
http://jonescenter.wharton.upenn.edu/VirtualCommunities/whalen.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 
2002). 
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The Eureka project changed the conception of the knowledge content of 
the machine and the organizational role of technicians from instruction 
followers to knowledge producers. In this system, a technician who came 
across a problem not clearly resolved in the manual posted a question 
electronically to a proprietary communications system accessible by all 
technicians. Any other technician in the system who had come across a 
similar problem could post a fix, which would be reviewed by experienced 
technicians, who would opine on its advisability. The technician who used 
the fix could then report on whether it worked. The whole transaction was 
stored in a database of solutions. The technicians were not compensated for 
answering queries but instituted instead a system of authorship and honor- 
based payoffs. Eureka also flipped the traditional hierarchical conception of 
knowledge in a machine as codified by engineers and implemented by 
instruction-following technicians. The knowledge content of the machine 
was now understood to be something that is incomplete when it leaves the 
design board and is completed over the life of the machines by technicians 
who share questions and solutions on a peer-review, volunteer model. 
The Eureka project suggests one additional interpretation of peer 
production in relation to markets and hierarchies. We generally understand 
the existence of markets and hierarchies as two ideal models of 
organization and observe various mixes of the two types in actual 
organizational practices. Eureka suggests that peer production can be a third 
ideal-type organizational model, which can be combined in various 
measures with the other two, forming a three-dimensional map of 
organizational strategies rather than the two-dimensional map recognized 
traditionally. 
Recognizing the lossiness of markets and managerial hierarchies 
suggests the first portion of a working hypothesis about why peer 
production has succeeded in gaining ground, namely the possibility that 
peer production may have lower information opportunity costs than markets 
or hierarchies. In particular, I suggest that the primary source of gains- 
which may be called information gains-that peer production offers is its 
capacity to collect and process information about human capital. The 
hypothesis is that rich information exchange among large sets of agents free 
to communicate and use existing information resources cheaply will create 
sufficiently substantial information gains that, together with the allocation 
gains that I will discuss in the following Section, overcome the information- 
exchange costs due to the absence of pricing and managerial direction and 
the added coordination costs created by the lack of property and contract. 
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Where the physical capital costs of information production are low and 
where existing information resources are freely or cheaply available,87 the 
low cost of communication among very large sets of agents allows agents to 
collect information through extensive communication and feedback instead 
of using information-compression mechanisms like prices or managerial 
instructions. If communications include a sufficiently large number of 
agents operating in the same resource and opportunity sets, this mode of 
communication can provide to each agent rich information about what 
needs to or can be done, who is doing what, and how other people value 
any given outcome. One sees this phenomenon in the centrality of effective 
communications platforms to the design of peer production processes-be 
they simple lists that lie at the heart of every free software development 
project88 or the sophisticated collaboration platforms that underlie projects 
like Slashdot or Kuro5hin. The value of these systems is precisely in 
enabling agents to use extensive information exchange and feedback to 
provide the same desiderata that prices and managerial commands provide 
in their respective models. 
Platform design and maintenance, and more importantly the human 
attention required to take in and use this information, are the equivalent for 
peer production of organization and decision costs in firms and of 
transaction costs in markets. The magnitude of these costs will partly be a 
function of the quality of the design of the collaboration platform in terms 
of efficiency of communication and information-processing utilities. This 
rich information exchange may or may not be efficient, depending on the 
magnitude of the cost and the relative information gains generated by the 
richer information available to agents through this system. 
Reducing uncertainty about the availability of opportunities for action 
by any given agent and about complementary actions by other agents 
becomes the salient potential source of information gain for peer production 
projects, while the capacity of a project to reduce the likely prevalence or 
efficacy of undermining actions becomes a major limiting factor. This latter 
effect, most obviously typified by the information-rich process of peer 
review, will occupy a substantial portion of Part III, where I will discuss in 
87. By limiting the hypothesis to information production under conditions of cheap and 
widely available physical capital (computers) and relatively free availability of information inputs, 
we can largely ignore uncertainty as to the availability of material resources, because the domain 
of application of the hypothesis relates to conditions where resources other than human creativity 
are not scarce, so that uncertainty as to their availability is minimal. 
88. At the heart of the distributed production system that is typified by open source software 
development is the notion of making the program available in a publicly accessible space for 
people to comment on and upgrade. See RAYMOND, supra note 9, at 26-28. These communication 
lists have also offered a valuable location for observers of the phenomenon to gain insight. See, 
e.g., Karim R. Lakhani & Eric von Hippel, How Open Source Software Works: "Free" User-to- 
User Assistance, 32 RES. POL'Y (forthcoming 2003) (describing support lists for Apache), 
available at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/lakhanivonhippelusersupport.pdf. 
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some detail the threats to effective peer production and the mechanisms 
available to this mode of production to defend itself from incompetence and 
defection. Here I will focus on the information gains generated by peer 
production in terms of opportunities both for creative and for novel 
utilization of existing resources89 and opportunities agents have to use their 
own talents, availability, focus, and motivation to perform a productive act. 
Central to my hypothesis about the information gains of peer 
production is the claim that human intellectual effort is highly variable and 
individuated. People have different innate capabilities, personal, social, and 
educational histories, emotional frameworks, and ongoing lived 
experiences. These characteristics make for immensely diverse associations 
with, idiosyncratic insights into, and divergent utilization of, existing 
information and cultural inputs at different times and in different contexts. 
Human creativity is therefore very difficult to standardize and specify in the 
contracts necessary for either market-cleared or hierarchically organized 
production. As human intellectual effort increases in importance as an input 
into a given production process, an organization model that does not require 
contractual specification of effort but allows individuals to self-identify for 
tasks will be better at gathering and utilizing information about who should 
be doing what than a system that does require such specification. Intra-firm 
hybrids, like incentive compensation, may be able to improve on firm-only 
or market-only approaches, but it is unclear how well they can overcome 
the core difficulty of requiring significant specification of the object of 
organization and pricing-in this case, human intellectual input. 
The point here is qualitative. It is not only, or even primarily, that more 
people can participate in production. The widely distributed model of 
information production will better identify who is the best person to 
produce a specific component of a project, all abilities and availability to 
work on the specific module within a specific time frame considered. With 
enough uncertainty as to the value of various productive activities and 
enough variability in the quality of information inputs and human creative 
talent vis-a-vis any set of production opportunities, coordination and 
continuous communications among the pool of potential producers and 
consumers can generate better information about the most valuable 
productive actions and the best human agents available at a given time. 
Although markets and firm incentive schemes are aimed at producing 
precisely this form of self-identification, the rigidities associated with 
collecting and comprehending bids from individuals through these systems 
89. This is a point Bessen makes about complex software, see Bessen, supra note 12, as well 
as a characteristic of the motivation Raymond describes as having an itch to scratch, RAYMOND, 
supra note 9, at 23 ("Every good work of software starts by scratching a developer's personal 
itch."). 
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(i.e., transaction costs) limit the efficacy of self-identification, relative to 
peer production. 
Now, self-identification is not always perfect, and some mechanisms 
used by firms and markets to codify effort levels and abilities-like formal 
credentials-are the result of experience with substantial errors or 
misstatements by individuals about their capacities. To succeed, therefore, 
peer production systems must also incorporate mechanisms for smoothing 
out incorrect self-assessments, like peer review in traditional academic 
research or the major sites like Slashdot or KuroShin, or like redundancy 
and statistical averaging in the case of NASA Clickworkers. In information 
terms, these mechanisms reduce the uncertainty associated with the likely 
presence of undermining actions by other agents. The prevalence of 
misperceptions that agents have about their own abilities and the cost of 
eliminating such errors will be part of the transaction costs associated with 
this form of organization that are parallel to quality control problems faced 
by firms and markets. This problem is less important where the advantage 
of peer production is in acquiring fine-grained information about 
motivation and availability of individuals who have otherwise widely 
available capabilities-like the ability to evaluate the quality of someone 
else's comment on Slashdot. It is likely more important where a particular 
skill set is necessary that may not be widespread-like the programming 
skills necessary to fix a bug in a program. 
2. Allocation Gains 
In addition to its potential information gains, peer production has 
potential allocation gains enabled by the large sets of resources, agents, and 
projects available to peer production. This gain is cumulative to the general 
information-processing characteristics of peer production and is based on 
the high variability of human capital, which suggests that there are 
increasing returns to the scale of the pool of individuals, resources, and 
projects to which they can be applied. 
As illustrated in Figure l(a), market- and firm-based production 
processes rely on property and contract to secure access to bounded sets of 
agents and resources in the pursuit of specified projects. The permeability 
of the boundaries of these sets is limited by the costs of making decisions in 
a firm about adding or subtracting a marginal resource, agent, or product 
and the transaction costs of doing any of these things through the market. 
Peer production relies on making an unbounded set of resources available 
to an unbounded set of agents, who can apply themselves toward an 
unbounded set of projects. The variability in talent and other idiosyncratic 
characteristics of individuals suggests that any given resource will be more 
or less productively used by any given individual and that the overall 
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productivity of a set of agents and a set of resources will increase when the 
size of the sets increases toward completely unbounded availability of all 
agents to all resources for all projects. Even if in principle the 
decisionmaker has information as to who is the best person for a job given 
any particular set of resources and projects (in other words, if the 
information gains are assumed away), the transaction or organizational 
costs involved in bringing that agent to bear on the project may be too great 
relative to the efficiency gain over use of the resource by the next-best 
available agent who is within the boundary. 
Assume that the productivity (PA) of a set of agents/resources is a 
function of the agents (A) available to invest effort (e) on resources (r). The 
productivity of Agent Al (PAI)90 is a function of the set of resources on 
which A1 can work (r1), the level of effort Al will invest (el), and AI's talent 
(ti). PA increases as a function of e, r, and the actions of other 
complementary agents and decreases by undermining actions of agents at a 
magnitude that is a function of t. Note that t is a personal characteristic of 
individuals that is independent of the set of resources open for A to work 
on, but will make a particular A more or less likely to be productive with a 
given set of resources in collaboration with other agents for the 
achievement of a set of outcomes. A's access to any given set of resources 
and potential collaborators therefore represents a probability, which is a 
function of t, that A will be productive with that resource and those 
collaborators for a given project.91 
The existence of t generates increasing returns to scale of the set of 
resources and to the set of agents to which it is available, because the larger 
the number of agents with access to a larger number of resources, the higher 
the probability that the agents will include someone with a particularly high 
t for productive use of a given rn at a given en as compared to other agents. 
Imagine a scenario where Al works for Firm F1 and has a higher t value as 
regards using r2 than A2 who works for Firm F2. If r2 is owned by F2, r2 will 
be used by the less efficient A2, so long as the value of A2 working on r2 is 
no less than the value of A1 working on r2 minus the transaction costs 
involved in identifying the relative advantage of Al and assigning Al to 
work on r2. This potential efficiency loss would be eliminated if Al were in 
the set of agents who had transaction-cost-free access to work on the 
resource set that includes r2. 
90. While VA discussed in the previous Section related to the private value of an action to an 
agent, PA is intended to represent the potential social value of the efforts of any one or more 
agents A as part of a potential collaborative ffort. 
91. In seeking to identify the private value of an outcome to an agent above, I described the 
successful completion of a project as an outcome OA, discounted by the probability q of OA 
obtaining should A do a. PA is the social equivalent of qOA to the individual, representing a 
judgment of whether an individual will be productive. 
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If Firms F1 and F2 each have a set of agents and resources, 
{AFI, rFl} and {AF2 ,rF2}, then PF1 + PF2 < PFI+F2. 
Figures l(a) and l(b) illustrate the point with another example. Figure 
l(a) assumes that there are two firms, each having contracts with a set of 
agents and property in a set of resources. Assume that as among {AI ... AS} 
in Firm F1 the best agent for using the combination (rl, r4) is A2. Assume 
also that as among the agents {A ... A9}, A8 is the best, in the sense that if 
A8 were to use these resources, the social value of the product would be 
greater by some measure (m) than when A2, the best agent within Firm Fl, 
uses them. 
It is unlikely that the two firms will have the information that A8 is best 
for the job, as I suggested in the discussion of information gains. Even if 
they do know, creativity will be misapplied as long as the transaction costs 
associated with transferring the creativity of A8 to Firm F1 or the property in 
r1 and r4 to Firm F2 are greater than m. When the firms merge, or when the 
agents and resources are in a commons-based peer production enterprise 
space, the best person can self-identify to use the resources, as in Figure 
1(b). Think of this as someone musing about fairy tales and coming up with 
a biting satire, which she is then capable of implementing, whereas the 
employee of the initial owner of the rights to the fairy tale might only 
produce a depressingly earnest new version. 
This initial statement is a simplification and understatement of the 
potential value of the function by which the sizes of the sets of agents and 
resources increase productivity. There are two additional components: the 
range of projects that might be pursued with different talent applied to a 
given set of resources and the potential for valuable collaboration. First, a 
more diverse set of talents looking at a set of resources may reveal available 
projects that would not be apparent when one only considers the set of 
resources as usable by a bounded set of agents. In other words, one of the 
advantages may be not the ability of A1 to pursue a given project with r2 
better than A2 could have but the ability to see that a more valuable project 
is possible. Second, the initial statement does not take into consideration the 
possible ways in which cooperating individuals can make each other 
creative in different ways than they otherwise would have been. Once one 
takes into consideration these diverse effects on the increased possibilities 
for relationships among individuals and between individuals and resources, 
it becomes even more likely that there are increasing returns to scale to 
increases in the number of agents and resources involved in a production 
process. 
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FIGURE 1. APPLYING AGENTS TO RESOURCES 
(a) Separated in Different Firms 
(b) In a Common Enterprise Space 
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Assume, for example, that every agent, given a t value, has some 
potential ability to use every resource, which could be measured as an 
option for that agent on that resource. (In other words, its value is derived 
from the value of the agent using the resource well, discounted by the 
probability that the agent will be good at using the resource.) Assume also 
that every agent has some potential to add value in collaboration with any 
other agent, and that every resource could have some potential value in 
combination with any other resource. If we have one agent, Al, and one 
resource, rl, we only get the value of the option of Al using rl. If we add 
one more resource, we get the value of Al using rl, Al using r2, and Al using 
rl in combination with r2. Symmetrically, if we keep the resource set fixed 
at one resource but add an agent, because the resources are nonrival, we 
would see the value of two agents and one resource as the sum of the values 
of Ai using rl, A2 using r1, and a collaboration between Ai and A2 to use ri. 
If we combine adding one agent and one resource, we see the following. 
The value of {Ai, rl} + {A2, r2}, if the two sets are strictly separated, is the 
value of Al using rl and A2 using r2. The value of {Ai, A2, rl, r2} in a single 
agent/resource space is the combined value of Al using rl and A2 using r2, 
Al using r2 and A2 using rl, AI using rl and r2 and A2 using ri and r2, Al and 
A2 collaborating to use rl, Al and A2 collaborating to use r2, and Al and A2 
collaborating to use rl and r2.92 
Figure 2 illustrates this point. Each arrow identifies one potential option 
for a valuable combination of agents and resources. In Figure 2(a), we see 
that separating the two agents and resources results in a combined value of 
only two options. Figure 2(b) shows the three combinations of a single 
agent with two resources. Likewise, Figure 2(c) represents the three options 
associated with two agents and one resource. In Figure 2(d), we see that, 
once both agents and resources are placed in the same opportunity set, the 
number of options for use and collaboration increases dramatically, with 
each arrow representing one of the nine potentially valuable combinations 
of agents and resources that the single agent-resource space makes possible. 
92. I am not sure there is room to formalize the precise relationship here on the style of 
Metcalfe's Law or Reed's Law. See David P. Reed, That Sneaky Exponential-Beyond 
Metcalfe's Law to the Power of Community Building, at http://www.reed.com/Papers/GFN/ 
reedslaw.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). From a policy perspective, there is no need to do so at 
this early stage of studying the phenomenon. It is sufficient for our purposes here to see that the 
collaboration effects and insights due to exposure to additional resources mean that the returns to 
scale are, as with other networks, more than proportional. 
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FIGURE 2. AGENT AND RESOURCE COMBINATIONS 
(a) Bounded Sets of One Agent and One Resource 
(b) One Agent Combined with Two Resources 
Coase's Penguin 
(c) Two Agents Combined with One Resource 
(d) Two Agents Combined with Two Resources 
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If this is true, then in principle a world in which all agents can act 
effectively on all resources will be substantially more productive in creating 
information goods than a world in which firms divide the universe of agents 
and resources into bounded sets. As peer production relies on opening up 
access to resources for a relatively unbounded set of agents, freeing them to 
define and pursue an unbounded set of projects that are the best outcome of 
combining a particular individual or set of individuals with a particular set 
of resources, this open set of agents is likely to be more productive than the 
same set could have been if divided into bounded sets in firms. Note that 
the effect changes dramatically when the resources are rival, because the 
value of any agent or combination of agents working on the resource is not 
additive to the value of any other agent or combination. In other words, the 
use of a rival resource excludes the use by others in a way that is not true 
for a purely nonrival good like information. The allocation gain is attained 
in allocating the scarce resource-human attention, talent, and effort- 
given the presence of nonrival resources to which the scarce resource is 
applied with only a probability of productivity. 
This is not to say that peer production will always necessarily be more 
productive or that it will always improve with size. First, adding agents may 
increase coordination and communication costs and heighten the probability 
that the set of agents will include individuals whose actions, through 
incompetence or malice, will undermine the productivity of the set. 
Second, in situations where focused but relatively standardized effort is 
more important than variability of talent, well-understood incentive systems 
based on monetary rewards could outweigh this effect, and markets and 
firms are much better understood mechanisms to generate the incentives for 
such an application of effort than is peer production. Even in these 
situations, however, monetary incentives will not necessarily be more 
efficient, even if better understood. If a project can be structured to resolve 
the effort/incentives problem without appropriation of the output, as I 
describe in Part III, the substantial increases in productivity resulting from 
the availability of a larger set of resources to a larger set of agents with 
widely variable talent endowments could be enough to make even an 
imperfectly motivated peer production process more productive than firms 
that more directly motivate effort but segment agents and resources into 
smaller bounded sets. Moreover, as Section III.A explains, a peer 
production project could increase, rather than decrease, motivation by 
eliciting contributions motivated by nonmonetary rewards when monetary 
rewards would have been either ineffective or inefficient. 
And third, as unbounded sets of agents utilize unbounded sets of 
resources for unbounded sets of projects, there is likely to be substantial 
duplication of effort. This duplication is wasteful if one considers actual 
likely patterns of peer production as compared to an idealized peer 
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production system where everyone self-identifies perfectly for the one 
contribution that they are best suited to produce. The question then becomes 
one of comparative efficiency: How much of a drag is duplication on the 
claimed increased efficiency provided by peer production enterprises? The 
answer has two primary components. First, as Part III will elaborate, peer 
production draws effort that in many cases would otherwise have been 
directed toward purely nonproductive consumption-say, watching 
television instead of marking craters on Mars, ranking websites for the 
Open Directory Project, or authoring entries for Wikipedia. On a 
macrolevel of social productivity, then, it enables an economic system to 
harness activities from which agents gain welfare to peer production efforts 
that also generate innovation and welfare for others. While duplication may 
limit the total value of this newly tapped source of productivity, it is less 
important to the extent that the duplication occurs among efforts that would, 
in the absence of a peer production system, have gone unused in the 
production system. Second, and probably more important, redundancy 
provides important values in terms of the robustness and innovativeness of 
a system. Having different people produce the same component makes the 
production system more resistant to occasional failures. Moreover, having 
different people with different experience and creative approaches attack 
the same problem will likely lead to an evolutionary model of innovation 
where alternative solutions present themselves, thus giving the peer 
production process the ability to select among a variety of actual solutions 
rather than precommitting to a single solution. 
III. OF MOTIVATION AND ORGANIZATION: THE COMMONS PROBLEM 
A. The "Incentives" Problem. Of Diverse Motivations and 
Small Contributions 
What makes contributors to peer production enterprises tick? Why do 
they contribute? There are two versions of this question. The first is the 
question of the economic skeptic. It questions the long-term sustainability 
of this phenomenon, given that people will not, after the novelty wears off, 
continue to work on projects in which they can claim no proprietary 
rights.93 It is to this question that my discussion here responds, in an effort 
to show that the network as a whole can be a sustainable system for the 
production of information and culture. There is a second, narrower version 
93. This skepticism is more often encountered in questions in conferences and presentations 
than in formal papers. A well-articulated written example of a skeptic's view, however, is Glass, 
supra note 11, comparing recruiting operating system developers to Tom Sawyer's whitewashing 
the fence trick and arguing that eventually operating system efforts will die because too many 
important programming tasks are not fun/sexy enough. 
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of the question, which arises once one overcomes the skepticism and begins 
to consider how peer production can be steered or predicted. It would seek 
to understand the motivations and patterns of clustering around projects in 
the absence of property rights and contracts and the emergence of the 
effective networks of peers necessary to make a particular project succeed. 
These are questions that present rich grounds both for theoretical and 
empirical study. My hunch is that these would best be done informally in 
the domains of social psychology and anthropology, or, if done formally, 
through artificial life-type modeling. They are, in any event, beyond the 
scope of this initial study, which is intended solely to define the 
phenomenon and assess its sustainability and welfare effects in general 
terms. 
As a practical matter, the incentive problem as an objection to the 
general sustainability of peer production is in large part resolved by the 
existence of a series of mechanisms for indirect appropriation of the 
benefits of participation catalogued quite comprehensively by Lerner and 
Tirole.94 At the broadest level, there is the pleasure of creation. Whether 
you refer to this pleasure dispassionately as "hedonic gain" or romantically 
as "an urge to create," the mechanism is simple. People are creative beings. 
They will play at creation if given an opportunity, and the network and free 
access to information resources provide this opportunity.95 More closely 
related to the project of keeping body and soul together, there is a variety of 
indirect appropriation mechanisms for those who engage in free software 
development. These range from the amorphous category of reputation 
94. Lerer & Tirole, supra note 10. 
95. Moglen makes this central to his explanation in Anarchism Triumphant as follows: 
It's an emergent property of connected human minds that they create things for one 
another's pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone. The only 
question to ask is, what's the resistance of the network? Moglen's Metaphorical 
Corollary to Ohm's Law states that the resistance of the network is directly 
proportional to the field strength of the "intellectual property" system. 
So, in the end, my dwarvish friends, it's just a human thing. Rather like why 
Figaro sings, why Mozart wrote the music for him to sing to, and why we all make up 
new words: Because we can. Homo ludens, meet Homo faber. 
Moglen, supra note 21. Raymond, as well as Lerner and Tirole, also offer hedonic gains as one 
component of their respective explanations. RAYMOND, supra note 2, at 13-14; Lerer & Tirole, 
supra note 10, at 213. There is, of course, something counterintuitive about calling hedonic 
pleasure "indirect" appropriation. I use the terms "direct" and "indirect" to distinguish between 
appropriation that relies directly on the economic exclusion made possible by intellectual property 
law and all other forms of appropriation. Direct appropriation supports the claim that intellectual 
property rights can increase information production, while indirect appropriation undermines the 
claim. On why it is that these two types of appropriation have this oppositional relationship as 
insights into the utility of the intellectual property rights, see Benkler, supra note 76 (explaining 
that intellectual property has positive effects on information-production strategies that are based 
on direct appropriation and negative effects on information-production strategies that rely on 
indirect appropriation, and that these effects will structure the organization of information 
production and its efficiency even when they have no effect on aggregate productivity in 
information production). 
424 [Vol. 112: 369 
Coase's Penguin 
gains96 to much more mundane benefits, such as consulting contracts, 
customization services, and increases in human capital that are paid for by 
employers who can use the skills gained from participation in free software 
development in proprietary projects. In this regard, it is important to note 
that about two-thirds of the revenues in the software industry are not tied to 
software publishing, but to service-type relationships.97 Given that two- 
thirds of the revenues of the software industry are service-based and that the 
total revenues of the software industry are three times the size of the movie, 
video, and sound-recording industries combined,98 indirect appropriation 
offers a rich field of enterprise for participants in free software 
development. 
The reality of phenomena like academic research, free software, the 
World Wide Web, NASA Clickworkers, and Slashdot supports these 
explanations with robust, if not quantified here, empirical grounding. All 
one need do is look at the Red Hat founders (no longer billionaires, but not 
quite on the bread line either)99 and IBM's billion-dollar commitment to 
96. But, as mentioned above, this commonly cited motivation has not been reconciled with 
the contrary practices of two of the most successful free software projects, Apache and the Free 
Software Foundation, neither of which provides personal attribution to code they bless. See supra 
note 7. 
97. The Economic Census of 1997 breaks up software into several categories, ranging from 
publishing to different types of services and education. Nonetheless, it is possible to collect the 
information about the industry as a whole using primarily the following three categories: software 
publishing (NAICS 5112), computer systems design and related services (NAICS 5415), and 
computer training (NAICS 61142). See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ECONOMIC ENSUS OF 1997, at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/us/US000.HTM [hereinafter ECONOMIC ENSUS OF 1997]. 
Software publishing had receipts of more than $61 billion (35%), computer systems design and 
related services roughly $109 billion (63%), and computer training roughly $2.5 billion (1.4%). 
Id. 
The Economic Census of 1997 divides computer systems design and related services into a 
number of subcategories: custom computer programming services (NAICS 541511, $38 billion); 
computer systems design services (NAICS 541512, $51 billion); computer facilities management 
services (NAICS 541513, $15 billion); and other computer related services (NAICS 541519, $4.3 
billion). Id. Finally, computer systems design services is further subdivided into computer systems 
integrators (NAICS 5415121, $35 billion) and computer systems consultants (NAICS 5415122, 
$16 billion). Id. The Economic Census defined computer systems design and related services as 
follows: 
This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing expertise in the 
field of information technologies through one or more of the following activities: (1) 
writing, modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a particular 
customer; (2) planning and designing computer systems that integrate computer 
hardware, software, and communication technologies; (3) on-site management and 
operation of clients' computer systems and/or data processing facilities; and (4) other 
professional and technical computer-related advice and services. 
U.S. Census Bureau, NAICS 54151: Computer Systems Design and Related Services, at 
http://www.census.gov/epcd/ec97/def/54151.HTM (last visited Oct. 27, 2002). 
98. The movie, video, and recording industries (NAICS 512) had total receipts of roughly 
$56 billion, as compared to roughly $173 billion for the software industry. ECONOMIC CENSUS OF 
1997, supra note 97. 
99. Red Hat is a company that specializes in packaging and servicing GNU/Linux operating 
systems. In 1999, it had an immensely successful IPO that made its founders billionaires, for a 
2002] 425 
The Yale Law Journal 
supporting Linux and Apache, on the one hand, and the tens of thousands of 
volunteer clickworkers, thousands of Linux developers, and hundreds of 
distributed proofreaders, on the other hand, to accept intuitively that some 
combination of hedonic gain and indirect appropriation can resolve the 
incentives problem. In this Part, I abstract from this intuitive observation to 
offer an answer that is more analytically tractable and usable to understand 
the microanalytic questions of peer production and the potential range in 
which peer production will be more productive than firms or markets. 
1. Abstracting the Effect of Diverse Motivations 
Saying that people participate for all sorts of reasons is obviously true 
at an intuitive level. It does not, however, go very far toward providing a 
basis for understanding why some projects draw many people, while others 
fail, or how the presence or absence of money affects the dynamic. What I 
will try to do in this Subsection is propose a framework to generalize the 
conditions under which peer production processes will better motivate 
human effort than market-based enterprises. Given the discussion of the 
information and allocation gains offered by peer production, this Subsection 
outlines a range in which peer production should be more productive than 
market-based or firm-based production. At the broadest level, wherever 
peer production can motivate behavior better than markets or firms, then 
certainly it will be superior. It will also be potentially better over a range 
where it may motivate behavior less effectively than markets or firms, but 
the contribution of the lower overall effort level will be less than the 
contribution of the added value in terms of information about, and 
allocation of, human creativity. 
Let any agent have a set of preferences for rewards of three types: 
M-> Monetary rewards, which decrease in value because of the 
decreasing marginal utility of money. Call the rate at which 
Mdecreases s (satiation). 
H-> Intrinsic hedonic rewards experienced from taking the 
actions. 
SP-> Social-psychological rewards, which are a function of the 
cultural meaning associated with the act and may take the 
form of actual effect on social associations and status 
perception by others or on internal satisfaction from one's 
while. The company, however, survived the bursting of the dot-com bubble and continues to lead 
the field of Linux distributions. 
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social relations or the culturally determined meaning of one's 
action. 
At an intuitive level, three common examples help to clarify this 
diversity of motivation. Simplest to see is how these motivations play out 
with regard to sex: the prostitution fee (M), the orgasm (H), and love (SP). 
One can also make and serve dinner to others for any combination of a fee 
(M), the pleasure of cooking (H), and companionship (SP). The 
combination of these interacting motivations shapes our understanding of 
whether we are observing a short-order cook, a restaurant chef, or a dinner 
party host. Similarly, one can write about law for a legal fee (M), the 
pleasure of creating a well-crafted argument (H), or the respect of the legal 
community or one's colleagues (SP). To some extent, all three exist for 
anyone writing, but in different measures partly depending on taste and 
partly depending on social role, such as whether the author is a practitioner, 
a judge, or an academic, as well as on other factors, such as external time 
constraints. 
The value of the three types of rewards for any given action might be 
independent of the value of the others, or it might not.100 For purposes of 
this analysis, I will assume that H is a personal preference that is 
independent of the other twol'0 but that M and SP can be positively or 
negatively correlated depending on the social construction of having money 
associated with the activity. I will call this factor p, which can be negative 
(as in prostitution) or positive (as in professional sports).102 The p factor is 
most interesting when it is negative and is intended to allow for the 
possibility of a "crowding-out" phenomenon,103 which has mostly been 
100. Needless to say, the independent value of each may be positive or negative. One might 
be willing to pay money to engage in hedonically pleasing or social-psychologically satisfying 
activities, as people do all the time for hobbies, and people often take hedonically unpleasant, 
socially awkward, or even demeaning jobs in order to get the positive monetary rewards. 
101. Separating out purely physical pleasure or pain from the social-psychological meaning 
of the cause of the pleasure or pain is artificial in the extreme. In principle, hedonic gain can be 
treated as part of SP, and indeed I ignore it as an independent factor in the analysis. I include it in 
the general statement largely to separate out the social-psychological aspect, which, unlike 
hedonic gains, is usually downplayed in economics. 
102. Again, the culturally contingent nature of the relationship should be obvious. When the 
Olympics were renewed in the modem era, they were limited to "amateurs," because professional 
sports were a form of entertainment, giving their paid performers no more respect than paid 
performers were given more generally. As with all performers, this changed with the status 
inversion that was part of the twentieth-century celebrity culture generated to focus mass demand 
on mass-produced entertainment as opposed to the relationship/presence-based entertainment of 
the past. 
103. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical 
Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 589 (2001); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of 
Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 
(1997); see also FEHR & GACHTER, supra note 83 (analyzing the ability of incentive contracts to 
undermine voluntary cooperation). For a broader moral claim about this tradeoff, see MARGARET 
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studied in the context of the relatively rare instances where altruistic 
provisioning has been the major, if not exclusive, mode of provisioning of 
socially important material goods among strangers, such as bloodl04 or 
gametes.'05 While analysis leaves serious questions as to whether altruistic 
provisioning of these types of goods is indeed superior to market-based 
provisioning as a general social policy,'06 the primary disagreement 
concerns which mode is more efficient in the aggregate, not whether market 
provisioning displaces altruistic provisioning or whether each mode draws 
different contributors.'07 Using our three intuitive examples, an act of love 
drastically changes meaning when one person offers the other money at its 
end, and a dinner party guest who takes out a checkbook at the end of 
dinner instead of bringing flowers or a bottle of wine at the beginning likely 
never will be invited again. The question of money in legal writing will 
depend on the social construction of the role of the author. For a practicing 
advocate, p usually is positive, and higher monetary rewards represent the 
respect the author receives for her craft. For a judge, p with regard to 
payment for any particular piece of writing is strongly negative, 
representing the prohibition on bribes. For academics, p for a particular 
piece of writing may be positive or negative, depending on whether its 
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996), and for a critique, see Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Invaluable Goods, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 757 (1997). 
104. The quintessential source of the claim that altruism is superior to markets in providing 
blood is RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (1971). 
105. See Ken R. Daniels, Semen Donors: Their Motivations and Attitudes to Their Offspring, 
7 J. REPROD. INFANT PSYCHOL. 121 (1989) (finding that a majority of donors surveyed in 
Australia and New Zealand gave altruistic reasons as the major motivation, with payment rated as 
rather unimportant); see also Simone B. Novaes, Giving, Receiving, Repaying. Gamete Donors 
and Donor Policies in Reproductive Medicine, 5 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 639 
(1989) (reviewing motivation for, and social issues of, sperm and egg donation and surrogacy); 
Simone B. Novaes, Semen Banking and Artificial Insemination by Donor in France: Social and 
Medical Discourse, 2 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 219 (1986) (providing an 
account of several sperm banks in France and an analysis of their varying policies on donor 
compensation). But see Linda S. Fidell et al., Paternity by Proxy: Artificial Insemination with 
Donor Sperm, in GENDER IN TRANSITION: A NEW FRONTIER 93, 100 (Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg 
ed., 1989) (reporting that three-quarters of sperm donors in the United States were primarily 
motivated by financial gain). 
106. Titmuss's thesis was challenged in a series of papers in the 1970s, see, e.g., Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972); Robert M. Solow, Blood and 
Thunder, 80 YALE L.J. 1696 (1971), and more recently has been subject to refinement with the 
experience of the AIDS epidemic, see Kieran Healy, The Emergence of HIV in the U.S. Blood 
Supply. Organizations, Obligations, and the Management of Uncertainty, 28 THEORY & SOC'Y 
529 (1999). 
107. Specifically for an evaluation of Titmuss's argument in light of the HIV crisis, see 
Kieran Healy, Embedded Altruism. Blood Collection Regimes and the European Union's Donor 
Population, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1633, 1637-54 (2000) (reporting on an international comparison and 
concluding that "the opportunity to sell plasma does reduce one's likelihood of giving blood"). 
More generally, for a description of empirical surveys in a number of areas, see Frey & Jegen, 
supra note 103 (describing empirical research in multiple disciplines supporting the displacement 
effect money has on voluntaristic motivations). 
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source is considered to be an interested party paying for something that is 
more akin to a brief than to an academic analysis, or, for example, a 
foundation or a peer-reviewed grant, in which case "winning" the support is 
considered as adding prestige. 
A distinct motivational effect arises when SP is associated with 
participation in collective action and concerns the presence or absence of 
rewards to the other participants and the pattern of the reward function- 
that is, whether some people get paid and others do not or whether people 
get paid differentially for participating. This relationship could be positive 
where altruism or a robust theory of desert culturally structures the social- 
psychological component of the reward to support monetary appropriation 
by others108 or, more commonly perhaps, negative where one agent is 
jealous of the rewards of another. I will denote this factor jalt 
(jealousy/altruism). 
Agents will then face different courses of action that they will perceive 
as having different expected rewards R: 
R = Ms + H + SPp,jalt 
At any given time, an agent will face a set of possible courses of action 
and will have a set of beliefs about the rewards for each course of action, 
each with this form. A rational agent will choose based on the value of R, 
not of M. Irrespective of one's view of whether the agent is a maximizer or 
a satisficer, the agent will have some total valuation of the rewards for 
adopting differing courses of action and hence of the opportunity cost of 
following courses of action that exclude other courses of action. 
It is quite intuitive to see then that there will be some courses of action 
whose reward will be heavily based on hedonic or social-psychological 
parameters, on primarily monetary rewards, or on a combination of all three 
factors. At the broadest level one can simply say that agents will take 
actions that have a positive value and low opportunity cost because they do 
not displace more rewarding activities. Similarly, where opportunities for 
action do compete with each other, an agent will pursue an activity that has 
low, zero, or even negative monetary rewards when the total reward, given 
the hedonic and social-psychological rewards, is higher than alternative 
courses of action that do have positive monetary rewards attached to them. 
Hence the phenomena of starving artists who believe they are remaining 
true to their art rather than commercializing or of law professors who 
108. A religiously motivated agent, for example, might consider the acquisition of monetary 
returns by other agents a positive sign of success, because the appropriators are seen as deserving 
in whatever theory of desert is prescribed by the religion, such as neediness or having been chosen 
in some sense. 
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forego large law-firm partner draws when they choose teaching and writing 
over the practice of law. 
What more can we say about the likely actions of agents whose 
preferences for rewards take the form I describe? First, there is a category 
of courses of action that will only be followed, if at all, by people who seek 
social-psychological and hedonic rewards. Assume that there are 
transaction costs for defining and making M and SP available to the agent, 
Cm and Csp, respectively. I assume that these costs are different, because the 
former require the definition and enforcement of property rights, contracts, 
and pricing mechanisms, while the latter require social mechanisms for the 
association of social-psychological meaning with the act generally and with 
the individual agent's act in particular. 
There is potentially a category of cases where the marginal value (V) of 
an agent's action will be less than the transaction costs of providing 
monetary rewards for it, in which case the expected monetary reward will 
be zero. If the social value of the contribution is greater than zero, however, 
and if the hedonic and social-psychological rewards are greater than zero 
and greater than the cost of making the social-psychological rewards 
available, then it will be socially efficient for agents to act in this way when 
opportunities to act arise. Agents will in fact do so if someone has incurred 
the costs of providing the opportunities for action and the social- 
psychological or hedonic rewards. 
Behaviors in the following range will therefore occur only if they can 
be organized in a form that does not require monetary incentives and 
captures behaviors motivated by social-psychological and hedonic rewards: 
Cm > V> Csp and H+ SP - Csp > 0 
Whether this range of activities is important depends first on the 
granularity of useful actions. The more fine-grained the actions and the 
more of these small-scale actions that need to be combined into a usable 
product, the higher the transaction costs of monetizing them relative to the 
marginal contribution of each action.109 
Second, approaches that rely on social-psychological rewards will be 
particularly valuable to motivate actions that are systematically undervalued 
in the market, because they generate high positive externalities. A fairly 
intuitive example is basic science, which is particularly ill-suited for 
proprietary information production because of its high positive 
externalities,110 and in which our social-cultural framework has developed 
109. Technology that lowers the transaction costs could counteract this effect, decreasing the 
size of the group of cases that fall into this category. 
110. The public goods problem of information production limits the efficacy of proprietary 
provisioning under any circumstances. The fact that basic science has many and varied uses as a 
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an elaborate honor-based rewards system rather than one focused on 
monetary rewards. We see similar social-psychological reward structures to 
reward and motivate participation in other practices that produce high 
positive externalities that would be difficult fully to compensate in 
monetary terms, like teaching; military service; or uncorrupt political, 
cultural, or spiritual leadership. Similarly, to the extent that peer production 
can harness motivations that do not require monetization of the 
contribution, the information produced using this model can be released 
freely, avoiding the inefficiencies associated with the public goods problem 
of information. 
It is important to recognize that actions involved in creating the 
opportunities for others to act are themselves acts with analogous reward 
structures. The scientists who created the Mars Clickworkers project 
operated on one set of monetary and social-psychological returns, while the 
clickworkers themselves operated in response to a different set of hedonic 
and social-psychological returns. The Open Source Development Network 
funds the Slashdot platform based on one set of rewards, including an 
expected monetary return, but its action generates opportunities for others 
to act purely on SP- and H-type rewards. The crucial point is that the 
presence of M-type rewards for the agent generating the opportunities does 
not necessarily negatively affect the social-psychological returns to agents 
who act on these opportunities. In other words, there is some reason why 
thejalt factor for the contributors is not a strong negative value even though 
monetary factors are captured by the person providing the opportunity for 
collaboration. 
We need, then, to state the relationship between the presence of M-type 
rewards for an action and the SP-type rewards associated with it. For 
simplicity, I will treat the total effect of both modifiers of SP as p, and will 
separate out jalt only where there is a reason to differentiate between the 
effect of monetary returns to the agent and the effects of differential reward 
functions for different agents in a collaborative group-as in the case where 
the person offering the opportunity to collaborate has different rewards 
from the participants in the collaboration. 
fundamental input into new innovation and learning creates particularly large positive exteralities 
and makes the public goods problem particularly salient in that context. The point was initially 
made in Nelson, supra note 26, at 306 ("The problem of getting enough resources to flow into 
basic research is basically the classical external-economy problem."). The point was reiterated in 
Arrow, supra note 71, at 623-25. A particularly helpful detailed discussion is Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale cDNA 
Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996). For more general statements of the 
relationship between academic and commercial work, see Richard R. Nelson, What Is 
"Commercial" and What Is "Public" About Technology, and What Should Be?, in TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 57, 65-70 (Nathan Rosenberg et al. eds., 1992). See also Ralph 
Gomory, The Technology-Product Relationship: Early and Late Stages, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra, at 383, 388. 
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Keeping hedonic gains to one side, the reward function can be 
represented as: 
R = M +SP 
This function suggests two key implications. First, we can confidently 
say that whenever M and SP are independent of each other or are positively 
correlated (that is, when p > 0), approaches that provide monetary rewards 
for an activity will be preferred to nonmonetizable approaches toward the 
exact same activity. A rational agent will prefer a project that provides both 
social-psychological and monetary rewards over one that offers only one of 
these rewards. Someone who loves to play basketball will, all other things 
being equal, prefer to be paid for playing at Madison Square Garden over 
playing at West Third and Sixth Avenue without being paid. 
Second, we can say that when M and SP are negatively correlated 
(p < 0), an activity will be more or less attractive to agents depending on the 
values of s and p-that is, on the rate at which the value of marginal 
monetary rewards for a new action is discounted by the agent and the rate at 
which the presence of money in the transaction devalues the social- 
psychological reward for that action. Table 3 maps the likely effects of 
monetary rewards on the value of R as a function of the values of s and p. 
We can say generally that individuals with a high discount rate on money 
(high s) will be likely to pursue activities with a high absolute value 
negative p rate only if these are organized in a nonproprietary model, 
because the value of Ms for them is low, and the presence of any M-type 
reward substantially lowers the value of SPp. At the simplest level, this 
could describe relatively wealthy people-for example, a wealthy person is 
unlikely to take a paying job serving lunch at a soup kitchen, but may 
volunteer for the same job. More generally, most people who have finished 
their day job and are in a part of their day that they have chosen to treat as 
leisure, even though a second job is available, can be treated as having a 
higher s value for that part of their day. During this portion of the day, it 
will likely be easier to attract people to a project with social-psychological 
benefits, and ifp is large and negative, adding monetary rewards will lower, 
rather than increase, participation. As we move toward a situation where the 
value of s for an individual is low, and the p rate, though negative, is low, 
we will tend to see a preference for combining M and SP, as one would 
where p is neutral or positive. 
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TABLE 3. EFFECTS OF INCREASED MONETARY REWARDS ON R 
Substantial or 
I ih ISubstantial decrease of R insignificant increase or 
decrease ofR1 
0LwInsignificant i crease or . . 
rewards will substantially decrease SP but will substantially increase M If the 
substantial decrease in SP and increase in M are roughly equivalent, then the 
overall result wil l be an insignificant change of R. If the substantial decrease orin SP 
and increase in M are not roughly equivalent, then the overall result on R will be a 
substantial change in the direction of the variable that has a larger value. For 
example, if the absolute value of the decrease in SP is much greater than the 
absolute value of the increase in M, then R will s ubstantially de crease. 
F inally, there may be way s in w hich p can be changed from negative to 
posi tive, o either its negative value can be reduced, by changing the way M is 
correlated to the action. To stay with the sex example, will substantially incthere is some 
socubstantial dscomfort associated w ith m ariage "for mo ney," it does n ot 
approach the level of social disapprobaan insignific t change of R. If the substantialon dir cted at prostitution. The p 
value is negative, bun M are not roughly esmaller. In othes, perhaps in times holding 
less egalitarian ideals abou t marriage, there might have actually been a 
positive pabsolute value- of the decreas in SPa "good catch." Similarly, professional per than thformers 
or athletes may havee been treated with less respect thantially amateurs a hundredase. 
years ago, but this has obviously changed quite dramatically. The same can 
be said for the jalt factor. One can imagine that free software-development 
communities would attach a negative social value to contributions of those 
who demand to be paid for their contributions. The same communities may 
have different feelings toward programmers who contributed for free but 
who later get large consulting contracts as a result of the experience and 
reputation they gaine d f rom their fdireely shared c ontributions. 
This analysis suggest s smaller ies o f likely conditions under which 
nonproprietary oan izational approaches w ill b e s ustainable. First, there is 
the case of projects that are broken down into fine-grainarly, professional performer 
market remuner ation would ith lkely b e spect too sustain, but where 
hedonic anwould cial-psychological rewards can provide contributions with 
positive rewards. As I will explain in thef foin e f-grained 
modularity is an important characteristic of the large-scale collaborations 
that form the basis of peer production. The analysis of motivations suggests 
433 2002] 
The Yale Law Journal 
that peer production likely will not be harnessed effectively using direct 
monetary incentives. Second, there are instances where the value of 
monetary return is small relative to the value of the hedonic and social- 
psychological rewards, particularly where the cultural construction of the 
social-psychological rewards places a high negative value on the direct 
association of monetary rewards with the activities. Teenagers and young 
adults with few economic commitments and a long time horizon for earning 
and saving, on the one hand, and high social recognition needs, on the other 
hand, are an obvious group fitting this description. Another group consists 
of individuals who have earnings sufficient to serve their present and 
expected tastes, but who have a strong taste for additional hedonic and 
social-psychological benefits that they could not obtain by extending their 
monetarily remunerated actions. Academics in general, and professional 
school academics in particular, are obvious instances of this group. Many of 
the volunteers for Internet-based projects who volunteer instead of 
watching television or reading a book likely fall into this category. 
Individuals whose present needs are met, but whose future expected needs 
require increased monetary returns, might participate if the social- 
psychological returns were not negatively correlated with future, indirect 
appropriation, such as reputation gains. This would effectively mean that 
they do add an M factor into their valuation of the rewards, but they do so 
in a way that does not negatively affect the value of SP for themselves or 
for other contributors to collaborative projects. 
2. Diverse Motivations and Large-Scale Collaborations 
The diversity of motivations allows large-scale collaborations to 
convert the motivation problem into a collaboration problem. In other 
words, the motivation problem is simple to resolve if the efforts of enough 
people can be pooled. 
In a corollary to "Linus's Law,"'11 one might say: 
Given a sufficiently large number of contributions, direct monetary 
incentives necessary to bring about contributions are trivial. 
The "sufficiently large" aspect of this observation requires some 
elaboration. "Sufficiently" refers to the fact that the number of people who 
need to collaborate to render the incentives problem trivial depends on the 
total cost or complexity of a project. The sustainability of any given project 
depends, therefore, not on the total cost but on how many individuals 
111. Coined by Eric Raymond to capture one of the attributes of the approach that developed 
Linux: "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." RAYMOND, supra note 9, at 30. 
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contribute to it relative to the overall cost. If a project that requires 
thousands of person-hours can draw on the talents of fifteen- or thirty- 
thousand individuals instead of a few dozen or a few hundred, then the 
contribution of each, and hence the personal cost of participation that needs 
to be covered by diverse motivations, is quite low. Similarly, a project that 
requires ten or twenty person-hours can be provided with little heed to 
incentives if it can harness the distributed efforts of dozens of participants. 
More generally, one can state: 
Peer production is limited not by the total cost or complexity of a 
project, but by its modularity, granularity, and the cost of 
integration. 
Modularity is a property of a project referring to the extent to which it 
can be broken down into smaller components, or modules, that can be 
independently and asynchronously produced before they are assembled into 
a whole. If modules are independent, individual contributors can choose 
what and when to contribute independently of each other, thereby 
maximizing their autonomy and flexibility to define the nature, extent, and 
timing of their participation in the project. Given the centrality of self- 
direction of human creative effort to the efficiencies of peer production, this 
characteristic is salient. 
Granularity refers to the size of the modules, in terms of the time and 
effort that an agent must invest in producing them. The number of people 
who will likely participate in a project is inversely related to the size of the 
smallest-scale contribution necessary to produce a usable module. Usability 
may place a lower boundary on granularity either for technical or economic 
reasons, where at a minimum the cost of integrating a component into a 
larger modular project must be lower than the value that adding that 
component contributes to the project. But above that boundary, the 
granularity of the modules sets the smallest possible individual investment 
necessary to participate in a project. If this investment is sufficiently low, 
then incentives for producing that component of a modular project can be of 
trivial magnitude and many people can contribute. If the finest-grained 
contributions are relatively large and would require large investment of 
time and effort, the universe of potential contributors decreases. A 
predominant portion of the modules in a large-scale peer production project 
must therefore be relatively fine-grained for the project to be successful. 
The discussion in the preceding Subsection suggests that, given the 
relatively small independent value such fine-grained contributions will have 
and the transaction costs associated with remunerating each contribution 
monetarily, nonmonetary reward structures are likely to be more effective 
to motivate large-scale peer production efforts. 
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Independent of the minimum granularity of a project, heterogeneity in 
the size of the modules may add to its efficiency. Heterogeneity allows 
contributors with diverse levels of motivation to collaborate by contributing 
modules of different sizes, whose production therefore requires different 
levels of motivation. Contributors may vary widely in their hedonic taste 
for creation, their social-psychological attitude toward participation, or in 
opportunities for indirect monetary appropriation (like the difference 
between IBM or Red Hat and individual volunteers in free software 
projects). A project that allows highly motivated contributors to carry a 
heavier load will be able to harness a diversely motivated human capital 
force more effectively than a project that can receive only standard-sized 
contributions. 
B. Integration: Problem and Opportunity 
The remaining obstacle to effective peer production is the problem of 
integration of the modules into a finished product. Integration includes two 
distinct components-first, a mechanism for providing quality control or 
integrity assurance to defend the project against incompetent or malicious 
contributions, and second, a mechanism for combining the contributed 
modules into a whole. It is here that the term "commons" that I use in 
describing the phenomenon as "commons-based peer production" gets its 
bite, denoting the centrality of the absence of exclusion as the organizing 
feature of this new mode of production and highlighting the potential 
pitfalls of such an absence for decentralized production. Observing 
commons-based peer production in the background of the commons 
literature, we see integration and the commons problem it represents solved 
in peer production efforts by a combination of four mechanisms: iterative 
peer production of the integration function itself, technical solutions 
embedded in the collaboration platform, norm-based social organization, 
and limited reintroduction of hierarchy or market to provide the integration 
function alone. In order for a project to be susceptible to sustainable peer 
production, the integration function must be either low-cost or itself 
sufficiently modular to be peer-produced in an iterative process. 
Upon what kind of commons is it, then, that peer production of 
information relies? Commons are most importantly defined by two 
parameters.112 The first parameter is whether use of the resource is common 
to everyone in the world or to a well-defined subset. The term "commons" 
is better reserved for the former, while the latter is better identified as a 
112. The most extensive consideration of commons and the resolution of the collective action 
problems they pose is OSTROM, supra note 17. 
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common property regime (CPR)"l3 or limited common property regime.14 
The second parameter is whether or not use of the resource by those whose 
use is privileged is regulated. Here one can state, following Carol Rose,115 
that resources in general can be subject to regimes ranging from total (and 
inefficiently delineated) exclusion-the phenomenon Michael Heller has 
called the anticommons 16-through efficiently delineated property and 
otherwise regulated access, to completely open, unregulated access. The 
infamous "tragedy of the commons" is best reserved to refer only to the 
case of unregulated access commons, whether true commons or CPRs. 
Regulated commons need not be tragic at all, and indeed have been 
sustained and shown to be efficient in many cases.l17 The main difference is 
that CPRs are usually easier to monitor and regulate-using both formal 
law and social norms18-than true commons; hence, the latter may slip 
more often into the open access category even when they are formally 
regulated. 
Elinor Ostrom also identified that one or both of two economic 
functions will be central to the potential failure or success of any given 
commons-based production system. The first is the question of 
provisioning, the second of allocation.19 This may seem trivial, but it is 
important to keep the two problems separate, because if a particular 
resource is self-renewing when allocated properly, then institutions 
designed to assure provisioning would be irrelevant. Fishing and whaling 
are examples. In some cases, provisioning may be the primary issue. 
113. See id. 
114. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998). 
115. Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of 
Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 480 (2000). 
116. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). Although Frank Michelman originated the 
concept of the anticommons, see Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of 
Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman eds., 1982), and Robert Ellickson coined the term "anticommons," see Ellickson, 
supra note 70, at 1322 n.22, I refer to Heller, because the concept took off with Heller's use. See 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 167 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2002) (describing the 
history of the term "anticommons"). 
117. For the most comprehensive survey, see OSTROM, supra note 17. Another seminal study 
was JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). A brief intellectual history of 
the study of common resource pools and common property regimes can be found in Charlotte 
Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool 
Resource, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke Law School, Nov. 9-11, 
2001, at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/ostromhes.pdf. 
118. The particular focus on social norms rather than on formal regulation as central to the 
sustainability of common resource pool management solutions that are not based on property is 
Ellickson's. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); Ellickson, supra note 70. 
119. "Provisioning" refers to efforts aimed at producing a particular good that would not 
otherwise exist. "Allocating" refers to decisions about how a good that exists, but is scarce 
relative to demand for it, will be used most efficiently. 
2002] 437 
The Yale Law Journal 
Ostrom describes various water districts that operate as common property 
regimes that illustrate well the differences between situations where 
allocation of a relatively stable (but scarce) water flow is the problem, on 
one hand, and those where provisioning of a dam (which will result in 
abundant water supply, relative to demand) is the difficult task.120 
Obviously, some commons require both operations. 
Information production entails only a provisioning problem. Because 
information is nonrival, once it is produced no allocation problem exists. 
Moreover, commons-based provisioning of information in a ubiquitously 
networked environment may present a more tractable problem than 
provisioning of physical matter, and shirking or free-riding may not lead 
quite as directly to nonproduction. This is so for three reasons. First, the 
modularity of the projects allows redundant provisioning of "dropped" 
components to overcome occasional defections without threatening the 
whole. Second, a ubiquitously networked environment substantially 
increases the size of the pool of contributors. At first glance, this should 
undermine peer production, because the likelihood of free-riding generally 
increases as the size of the pool increases and the probability of social- 
norms-based prevention of free-riding declines.121 But as the size of the 
pool increases, the project can tolerate increasing levels of free-riding, as 
long as the absolute number of contributors responding to some mix of 
motivations remains sufficiently large such that the aggregation of the 
efforts of those who do contribute, each at a level no higher than his or her 
level of motivation dictates, will be adequate to produce the good. As long 
as free-riders do not affirmatively undermine production but simply do not 
contribute, the willingness of contributors to contribute should depend on 
their perception of the likelihood of success given the number of 
contributors, not on the total number of users. Indeed, for contributors who 
seek indirect appropriation through means enhanced by widespread use of 
the joint product-like reputation or service contracts-a high degree of use 
of the end product, even by "free-riders" who did not contribute to 
providing it, increases the expected payoff.122 Third, the public goods 
nature of the product means that free-riding does not affect the capacity of 
contributors to gain full use of their joint product and does not degrade their 
120. OSTROM, supra note 17, at 69-88. 
121. On the relationship between how small and closely knit a group is and its capacity to use 
social norms to regulate behavior, see ELLICKSON, supra note 118. On the importance of social 
norms in regulating behavior in cyberspace, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999). 
122. This attribute causes Steven Weber to describe free software production not only as 
"nonrival," but as "anti-rival"-by which he means that increasing returns to widespread use 
mean that consumption by many not only does not reduce the value of a good, as in nonrival 
goods, but actually enhances it. See WEBER, supra note 8, at 28-29. 
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utility from it. This permits contributors who contribute in expectation of 
the use value of the good to contribute without concern for free-riding. 
There are, however, types of defection that are likely to undermine 
provisioning by adversely affecting either (1) motivation to participate or 
(2) the efficacy of participation. The first type covers actions that reduce the 
value of participation, be it the intrinsic hedonic or social-psychological 
components or the expected longer-term extrinsic values, that is, the 
monetary rewards to reputation, human capital, etc. The second type relates 
mostly to potential failures of integration, such as poor quality-control 
mechanisms. 
1. Threats to Motivation 
There are two kinds of actions that could reduce the intrinsic benefits of 
participation. First is the possibility that a behavior will affect the 
contributors' valuation of the intrinsic value of participation. Two primary 
sources of negative effect seem likely. The first is a failure of integration, 
so that the act of individual provisioning is seen as being wasted, rather 
than adding some value to the world. This assumes that contributors have a 
taste for contributing to a successful joint project. Where this is not the 
case-if integration is not a component of the intrinsic value of 
participation-then failure to integrate would not be significant. The World 
Wide Web is an example where it is quite possible that putting up a website 
on a topic one cares about is sufficiently intrinsically valuable to the author, 
even without the sense of adding to the great library of the Web, that 
integration is irrelevant to the considerations of many contributors. 
The more important potential "defection" from commons-based peer 
production is unilateral123 appropriation. Unilateral appropriation could, but 
need not, take the form of commercialization of the common efforts for 
private benefit. More generally, appropriation could be any act where an 
individual contributor tries to make the common project reflect his or her 
values too much, thereby alienating other participants from the product of 
their joint effort. The common storytelling enterprise called LambdaMOO 
encountered well-described crises with individuals who behaved in 
antisocial ways, taking control over the production process to make the 
joint product serve their own goals-like forcing female characters in the 
story to "have sex" that they did not want to have.124 In LambdaMOO, the 
participants set up a social structure for clearing common political will in 
123. Unilateral is opposed to collective, as in the conversion of some aspect of the commons 
to a common property regime where, for example, high quality or consistent contribution to the 
commons could become a criterion for membership. 
124. LESSIG, supra note 121, at 74-75. 
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response to this form of appropriation.125 In the examples I have described 
in this Article, the explicit adherence to a norm of objectivity in 
Wikipedia126 and similar references in Kuro5hin to the norm of high-quality 
writing are clear examples of efforts to use social norms to regulate this 
type of defection by substantive, rather than commercial, appropriation. 
Similarly, some of the software-based constraints on moderation and 
commenting on Slashdot and other sites serve to prevent anyone from 
taking too large a role in shaping the direction of the common enterprise in 
a way that would reduce the perceived benefits of participation to many 
others. For example, limiting moderators to moderating no more than five 
comments in any three-day period or using troll filters to prevent users from 
posting too often are technical constraints that do not permit anyone to 
appropriate the common enterprise called Slashdot. 
Another form of appropriation that could affect valuation of 
participation is simple commercialization for private gain. The primary 
concern is that commercialization by some participants or even by 
nonparticipants will create a sucker's reward aspect to participation. This is 
the effect I introduced into the abstract statement of diverse motivations as 
the jalt factor-the effect of monetary rewards for others on the perceived 
value of participation. One example of such an effect may have occurred 
when the early discussion moderators on AOL boards-volunteers all-left 
when they began to realize that their contributions were effectively going to 
increase the value of the company. There is, however, an immensely 
important counterexample-to wit, the apparent imperviousness of free 
software production, our paradigm case, to this effect. Some contributors 
have made billions, while some of the leaders of major projects have earned 
nothing but honor.127 Query, though, whether the pattern would have held if 
the primary leader of a project, such as Linus Torvalds, rather than people 
less central to the Linux kernel development process, had made money 
explicitly by selling the GNU/Linux operating system as a product. It is, in 
any event, not implausible to imagine that individuals would be more 
willing to contribute their time and effort to NASA or a nonprofit enterprise 
than to a debugging site set up by Microsoft. Whether the jalt effect exists, 
how strong it is, and what are the characteristics of instances when it is or is 
not important is a valuable area for empirical research. 
In addition to the intrinsic value of participation, an important 
component of motivation also relies on the use value of the joint project and 
125. See Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster 
Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, VILLAGE VOICE, 
Dec. 21, 1993, at 36, at ftp://ftp.lambda.moo.mud.org/pub/MOO/papers/VillageVoice.txt. 
126. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
127. In this, too, peer production is similar to academic production, where scientists see their 
basic research used, very often by others, as the basis for great wealth in which they do not share. 
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on indirect appropriation based on continued access to the joint product- 
service contracts and human capital for instance. For such projects, 
defection may again take the form of appropriation, in this case by 
exclusion of contributors from the use value of the end product. (Why 
academics, for example, are willing to accept the bizarre system in which 
they contribute to peer review journals for free, sometimes even paying a 
publication fee, and then have their institutions buy this work back from the 
printers at exorbitant rates remains a mystery.) In free software, the risk of 
defection through this kind of appropriation is deemed a central threat to the 
viability of the enterprise, and the GNU GPL is designed precisely to 
prevent one person from taking from the commons, appropriating the 
software, and excluding others from it.128 This type of defection looks like 
an allocation problem-one person is taking more than his or her fair share. 
But again, this is true only in a metaphoric sense. The good is still 
intrinsically a public good and is physically available to be used by 
everyone. Law (intellectual property) may create this "allocation problem" 
in a misguided attempt to solve a perceived provisioning problem, but the 
real problem is the effect on motivation to provision, not an actual scarcity 
that requires better allocation. The risk of this kind of unilateral 
appropriation lowers the expected value contributors can capture from their 
contribution, and hence lowers motivation to participate and provide the 
good. 
2. Provisioning Integration 
Another potential problem that commons-based peer production faces 
is provisioning of the integration function itself. It is important to 
understand that integration requires some process for assuring the quality of 
individual contributions. This could take the form of (1) hierarchically 
managed review, as in the Linux kernel or Apache development processes; 
(2) peer review, as in the process for moderating Slashdot comments; (3) 
norms-based social organization, as in Wikipedia's objectivity norm; or (4) 
aggregation and averaging of redundant contributions, as in the Mars 
Clickworkers project. Academic peer production of science is traditionally 
some combination of the first three, although the Los Alamos Archive'29 
and the Varmus proposal for changing the model of publication in the 
128. Free Software Found., supra note 19. Section 2(b) limits the license to modify software 
distributed under the GPL such that the licensee "must cause any work that you distribute or 
publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be 
licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License." Id. 
129. ArXiv.org, ArXiv.org E-Print Archive, at http://www.arxiv.org (last visited Sept. 25, 
2002). 
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health and biomedical sciences130 to free online publication coupled with 
post-publication peer commentary as a check on quality would tend to push 
the process further toward pure peer review and norms-based enforcement 
of the core values of completeness and accuracy, as well as attribution and 
respect for priority. 
The first thing to see from the discussion of threats to motivation is that 
provisioning integration by permitting the integrator to be the residual 
owner (in effect, to "hire" the contributors and act as the entrepreneur) 
presents substantial problems for the motivation to contribute in a peer- 
based production model. Appropriation may so affect motivation to 
participate that the residual owner will have to resort to market- and 
hierarchy-based organization of the whole production effort. Second, 
property rights in information are always in some measure inefficient.131 
Creating full property rights in any single agent whose contribution is only 
a fraction of the overall investment in the product is even less justifiable 
than doing so for a person who pays all of the production costs. Third, 
integration is quite possibly a low-cost activity, particularly with the 
introduction of software-based management of the communications and to 
some extent the integration of effort. To the extent that this is so, even 
though integration may require some hierarchy or some market-based 
provisioning, it is a function that can nonetheless be sustained on low 
returns by volunteers, like those who run integration of code into the Linux 
kernel or by publicly funded actors, as in the case of NASA Clickworkers. 
It can also be sustained by firms, like the Open Source Development 
Network that supports Slashdot, that rely on business models that do not 
depend on intellectual property rights. 
The cost of integration-and hence the extent to which it is a limit on 
the prevalence of peer production-can be substantially reduced by 
automation and the introduction of an iterative process of peer production 
of integration itself. First, integration could be a relatively automated 
process for some products. The use of automated collation of markings and 
averaging out of deviations by NASA Clickworkers is an example, as are 
many of the attributes of Slashdot or Kuro5hin. Second, the integration 
function itself can be peer-produced. Again with Slashdot, the software that 
provides important integration functions is itself an open source project-in 
other words, peer-produced. The peer review of the peer reviewers-the 
moderators-is also distributed, in that ninety percent of registered users 
can review the moderators, who in turn review the contributors. As peer 
production is iteratively introduced to solve a greater portion of the 
130. Harold Varmus, E-BIOMED: A Proposal for Electronic Publications in the Biomedical 
Sciences (1999), at http://www.nih.gov/about/director/pubmedcentral/ebiomedarch.htm. 
131. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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integration function, the residual investment in integration that might 
require some other centralized provisioning becomes a progressively 
smaller investment, one that is capable of being carried on by volunteers or 
by firms that need not appropriate anything approaching the full value of 
the product.132 
Moreover, integration could provide an opportunity for cooperative 
monetary appropriation, not only, or even primarily, integration into a 
general product but integration as a specific customization for specific 
users.133 There are no models for such cooperative appropriation on a large 
scale yet, but the idea is that many peers will be admitted to something that 
is more akin to a common property regime or partnership than a commons, 
probably on the basis of reputation for contributing to the commons, and 
these groups would develop a system for receiving and disseminating 
service/customization projects (if it is a software project) or other 
information-production projects. This would not necessarily work for all 
information production, but it could work in some. The idea is that the 
indirect appropriation itself would be organized on a peer model so that 
reputation would lead not to being hired as an employee by a hierarchical 
firm, but would instead be an initiation into a cooperative, managed and 
"owned" by its participants. Just as in the case of Slashdot, some 
mechanism for assuring quality of work in the products would be necessary, 
but it would be achievable on a distributed model, rather than a hierarchical 
model, with some tracking of individual contribution to any given project 
(or some other mechanism for distribution of revenues). The idea here 
would be to provide a peer-based model for allowing contributors to share 
the benefits of large-scale service projects, rather than relegating them to 
individual indirect appropriation. 
To conclude, whether or not a peer production project will be able to 
resolve the integration problem is a central limiting factor on the viability of 
peer production to provision any given information goods. Approaches to 
integration include technology, as with the software running Slashdot or the 
Clickworkers project; iterative peer production, such as the moderation and 
meta-moderation on Slashdot; social norms, as with Wikipedia's or 
KuroShin; and market or hierarchical mechanisms that integrate the project 
without appropriating the joint product, as is the case in the Linux kernel 
development community. 
132. Boyle focuses on this characteristic as the most interesting and potentially important 
solution. See Boyle, supra note 24, at 13. 
133. I owe the idea of cooperative monetary appropriation to an enormously productive 
conversation with David Johnson. It was his idea that the peer production model can be combined 
with the producers' cooperative model to provide a mechanism of appropriation that would give 
contributors to peer production processes a more direct mechanism for keeping body and soul 
together while contributing, rather than simply waiting for reputation gains to be translated into a 
contract with a company. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I suggest that peer production of information is a 
phenomenon with much broader economic implications for information 
production than thinking of free software alone would suggest. I describe 
commons-based peer production enterprises occurring throughout the value 
chain of information production on the Internet, from content production, 
through relevance and accreditation, to distribution. I then explain that peer 
production has a systematic advantage over markets and firms in matching 
the best available human capital to the best available information inputs in 
order to create information products. 
Peer production of information is emerging because both the declining 
price of physical capital involved in information production and the 
declining price of communications lower the cost of peer production and 
make human capital the primary economic good involved. These trends 
both lower the cost of coordination and increase the importance of peer 
production's relative advantage-identifying the best available human 
capital in highly refined increments and allocating it to projects. If true, this 
phenomenon has a number of implications both for firms seeking to 
structure a business model for the Internet and for governments seeking to 
capitalize on the Internet to become more innovative and productive. 
For academics, peer production provides a rich area for new research. 
Peer production, like the Internet, is just emerging. While there are some 
studies of peer-produced software, there is little by way of systematic 
research into peer production processes more generally. There is much 
room for theoretical work on why they are successful, as well as potential 
pitfalls and the solutions that, in principle and in practice, can be adopted in 
response to those pitfalls. The role of norms, the role of technology, and the 
interaction between volunteerism and economic gain in shaping the 
motivation and organization of peer production are also important areas of 
research, in particular for the study of how peer groups cluster around 
projects. Qualitative and quantitative studies of the importance of peer 
production in the overall information economy, in particular the Interet- 
based information economy, would provide a better picture of just how 
central or peripheral a phenomenon this is. 
For firms, the emergence of peer production may require a more 
aggressive move from information product-based business models to 
information-embedding material products and service-based business 
models. Businesses could, following IBM or Red Hat in open source 
software, focus their "production" investment on providing opportunities 
for peer production, aiding in that production, and performing some of the 
integration functions. Firms that adopt this model, however, will not be able 
to count on appropriating the end product directly, because the threat of 
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appropriation will largely dissipate motivations for participation. Indeed, 
the capacity of a firm to commit credibly not to appropriate the joint project 
will be crucial to its success in building a successful business model 
involving a peer production process. This commitment would require 
specific licenses that secure access to the work over time to everyone, 
including contributors. It would also require a business model that depends 
on indirect appropriation of the benefits of the product.134 Selling products 
or services for which availability of the peer-produced product increases 
demand could do this, as in the case of IBM servers that run the 
GNU/Linux operating system and Apache server software. Conversely, 
firms that benefit on the supply side from access to certain types of 
information can capitalize on peer production processes to provide that 
input cheaply and efficiently, while gaining the firm-specific human capital 
to optimize their product to fit the information. Again, IBM's investment in 
engineers who participate in writing open source software releases it from 
reliance on proprietary software owned by other firms, thereby creating 
supply-side economies to its support of peer production of software. 
Similarly, NASA's utilization of peer production reduces its costs of 
mapping Mars craters, and Google's use of links provided by websites as 
votes for relevance integrates distributed relevance judgments as input into 
its own commercial product. Another option is sale of the tools of peer 
production itself. For example, the popularity of software and access to 
massive multiplayer online games like Ultima Online or Everquest are 
instances of a growing industry in the tools for peer production of escapist 
storytelling.135 
For regulators, the implications are quite significant. In particular, the 
current heavy focus on strengthening intellectual property rights is exactly 
the wrong approach to increasing growth through innovation and 
information production if having a robust peer production sector is 
important to an economy's capacity to tap its human capital efficiently. 
Strong intellectual property rights, in particular rights to control creative 
utilization of existing information, harm peer production by raising the cost 
of access to existing information resources as input. This barrier limits the 
capacity of the hundreds of thousands of potential contributors to consider 
what could be done with a given input and to apply themselves to it without 
violating the rights of the owner of the information input. This does not 
mean that intellectual property rights are entirely bad. But we have known 
134. For a general mapping of indirect appropriation mechanisms, see Benkler, supra note 
76. 
135. See Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report: The Computer Game Industry Seeks To Bridge 
an Online Gap Between Geeks and the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at C5. A 
somewhat optimistic report estimates that this industry will pull in some $1.3 billion by 2006. See 
Tamsin McMahon, Gaming Platforms Setfor Explosive Growth, EUROPEMEDIA, July 3, 2002, at 
http://www.europemedia.net/showness.asp?ArticlelD=1 1326. 
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for decades that intellectual property entails systematic inefficiencies as a 
solution to the problem of private provisioning of the public good called 
information. The emergence of commons-based peer production adds a new 
source of inefficiency. 
The strength of peer production is in matching human capital to 
information inputs to produce new information goods. Strong intellectual 
property rights inefficiently shrink the universe of existing information 
inputs that can be subjected to this process. Instead, owned inputs will be 
limited to human capital with which the owner of the input has a 
contractual-usually employment-relationship. Moreover, the entire 
universe of peer-produced information gains no benefit from strong 
intellectual property rights. Since the core of commons-based peer 
production entails provisioning without direct appropriation and since 
indirect appropriation-intrinsic or extrinsic-does not rely on control of 
the information but on its widest possible availability, intellectual property 
offers no gain, only loss, to peer production. While it is true that free 
software currently uses copyright-based licensing to prevent certain kinds 
of defection from peer production processes, that strategy is needed only as 
a form of institutional jiujitsu to defend from intellectual property.136 A 
complete absence of property in the software domain would be at least as 
congenial to free software development as the condition where property 
exists, but copyright permits free software projects to use licensing to 
defend themselves from defection. The same protection from defection 
might be provided by other means as well, such as creating simple public 
mechanisms for contributing one's work in a way that makes it 
unsusceptible to downstream appropriation-a conservancy of sorts. 
Regulators concerned with fostering innovation may better direct their 
efforts toward providing the institutional tools that would help thousands of 
people to collaborate without appropriating their joint product, making the 
information they produce freely available rather than spending their efforts 
to increase the scope and sophistication of the mechanisms for private 
appropriation of this public good as they now do. 
That we cannot fully understand a phenomenon does not mean that it 
does not exist. That a seemingly growing phenomenon refuses to fit our 
longstanding perceptions of how people behave and how economic growth 
occurs counsels closer attention, not studied indifference and ignorance. 
Commons-based peer production presents a fascinating phenomenon that 
could allow us to tap substantially underutilized reserves of human creative 
effort. It is of central importance that we not squelch peer production, but 
that we create the institutional conditions needed for it to flourish. 
136. But see McGowan, supra note 13, at 287-88 (arguing that the right to exclude will 
always be necessary to prevent opportunistic appropriation of open source code). 
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